The evidence, fairly interpreted, permitted the jury to apportion responsibility for the subject automobile accident as it did, particularly since assigning fault depended in large measure on credibility assessments ( see Wiseberg v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons and Ives, Inc., 224 A.D.2d 361, 362).
Defendants were not deprived of a fair trial or of the opportunity to present a defense by the conduct of the trial court. Although the court conducted the trial assertively and frequently interrupted witness examinations, the record discloses that its interventions were properly directed at clarifying the testimony and expediting the proceedings ( see Delcor Lab., Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 263 A.D.2d 402, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 761; cf. Campbell v. Rogers Wells, 218 A.D.2d 576). The court also properly exercised its discretion in limiting the testimony of defendants' experts to matters detailed in the expert disclosure reports ( see CPLR 3101[d][1]).
The awards for past and future pain and suffering, however, deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation under the circumstances (CPLR 5501[c]). Although plaintiff underwent fusion surgery to repair the sacroiliac joint injury she sustained in the accident, experienced and continues to experience pain in her back, hip and legs, and has suffered emotional sequellae from the accident and the lifestyle limitations dictated by her injuries, the awards of $1.5 million for past pain and suffering and $3 million for future pain and suffering are disproportionate ( see Amonbea v. Perry Beverage Distribs., Inc., 294 A.D.2d 285; Valentin v. City of New York, 293 A.D.2d 313; Diaz v. W. 197th St. Realty Corp., 290 A.D.2d 310, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 603).
M-2593 — Lewis v. The Port Authority of N.Y. NJ, et al.
Motion seeking leave to strike reply brief denied.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.