DIANE SIGMUND, Bankruptcy Judge
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Washington Mutual, as successor-in-interest to Fleet Mortgage Corp., ("Lender") with respect to the Complaint of the debtor Barbara Young ("Debtor"). The Complaint seeks to set aside a pre-petition sheriff's sale of Debtor's residence. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
The above-captioned adversary proceeding was dismissed against defendants William C. Miller, Esq. (the "Chapter 13 Trustee") and Sheriff John D. Green (the "Sheriff") in March 2004 for lack of prosecution. Phoenix Property ("Phoenix") did not submit any papers in connection with the Motion and appears to be relying upon Lender's efforts to secure dismissal of the Complaint.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. Debtor was the owner of real property located at 4914 N. 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19141 ("Premises"). On April 20, 2001, Debtor filed a petition under Chapter 13 ("Bankruptcy Case I") to stop the execution of a sheriff's sale of the Premises. Lender moved for relief from the stay, which motion was settled by a stipulation approved by the Court on April 23, 2002 ("Stipulation I"). However, on May 20, 2002, Lender filed a certificate of default after Debtor breached the terms of Stipulation I, and Lender was granted relief from the stay on May 23, 2002.
On July 3, 2002, Debtor filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting Lender relief from the automatic stay. The motion for reconsideration was resolved by a second stipulation that was approved by this Court on September 23, 2002 ("Stipulation II").
Under the terms of Stipulation II, the sheriff's sale that was scheduled for September 10, 2002 was continued to November 12, 2002. In addition, Lender agreed that the automatic stay would be reimposed so long as Debtor complied with a payment obligation by October 1, 2002 ("the Payment") and continued to remain current in taxes and insurance for the Premises. The parties further agreed that if Debtor failed to timely make the Payment, then the sheriff sale scheduled for November 12, 2002 could proceed. While Debtor made the Payment, on October 23, 2002 Bankruptcy Case I was dismissed on motion of the Chapter 13 Trustee for Debtor's failure to make payments under her Chapter 13 plan. Doc. No. 52. With the automatic stay inoperative since Debtor was no longer in bankruptcy, Lender proceeded with the sheriff's sale scheduled for November 12, 2002. Phoenix purchased the Premises at the sale, and on or about December 9, 2002, the Sheriff deeded the Premises to it. Phoenix has filed an opposition to the relief sought in the Complaint contending that it expended monies to purchase the Premises and attorney's fees attempting to evict Debtor.
The Stipulation which was attached to Lender's Brief in Support of Motion and of which the Court takes judicial notice, Fed.R.Evid. 201, provides, in pertinent part:
5. Debtor has agreed to cure the default under the terms of the Stipulation and Movant shall agree to reimposition of the Automatic Stay so long as:
a. Debtor pays $1,588.80 in certified funds to counsel for Movant by October 1, 2002; and
b. Debtor continues to pay her own taxes and insurance on the property, and provides proof of same to Movant annully [sic].
6. Should Debtor fail to pay the $1588.80 to Counsel for Movant by October 1, 2002, the Sheriff Sale of November 12, 2002 shall go forward.
The parties also agreed that Stipulation II constituted their entire agreement and could only be modified in writing. There is no evidence of any modification.
Debtor took no steps in the state court to set aside the sheriff's sale of the Premises. Rather on December 2, 2002 Debtor filed this, her second bankruptcy case ("Bankruptcy Case II") which has stayed eviction. However, it was not until almost one year later on November 20, 2003 that she commenced the instant adversary proceeding to set aside the sale. Debtor contends that as she complied with all the conditions of Stipulation II, Lender was required to forbear from prosecuting the November 12 sheriff's sale. On that basis, although citing no legal authority for me to do so, she asks that I void and set the sale aside. Debtor does not allege that there were any procedural infirmities with the sale nor otherwise contend that it was not conducted in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law. Debtor simply argues that paragraph 6 of Stipulation II provided her with "a defense against seizure through a Sheriff's Sale." Plaintiff's Brief at 2. Paragraph 6, as Debtor notes, provides that the sale shall go forward if she does not make the Payment. Since she did make the Payment, Debtor reasons in the converse that the sale should not have been held.
Debtor's action to file the Complaint after one year of inaction may have been spurred by Phoenix's request on November 10, 2003 to re-list its motion for relief from the stay. (Phoenix first sought relief from the stay in July 2003 to evict Debtor from the Premises but the motion was settled on terms presumably not relevant as not made part of this record.) However, the request was denied without prejudice pending the resolution of this Motion.
In response, Lender contends that it was free to pursue the sheriff's sale of the Premises after Bankruptcy Case I was dismissed because Debtor was no longer in bankruptcy and it was no longer subject to the automatic stay. Moreover, Lender argues that the terms of Stipulation II, and Debtor's performance in accordance therewith, did not otherwise preclude the sheriff's sale from proceeding.
Lender fails to raise the more fundamental issue that Debtor has not stated a legal ground for the relief she seeks. Debtor relies on this Court's "equitable powers" but does not explain their source. While her brief provides authority for enforcing stipulations, it does not address the power of this court to set aside a regularly conducted foreclosure sale. Since I find that there is no basis to grant Debtor the relief she seeks based on the agreement upon which she relies, I do not have to reach the questionable proposition that a final and validly conducted sale of real property to a bona fide purchaser could be undone by this Court as she requests.
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment is governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P.") 56 applicable in this proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 7056. Summary judgment, "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment must overcome the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a material question of fact.Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The substantive law will determine which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 255. A court must find that the motion alleges facts which, if proven at trial, would require a directed verdict. 6 J. Moore,Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 56.26 (2d ed. 1988). If so, the respondent "must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial," and may not "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the non-movant's evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The absence of a genuine issue for trial is evident where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Mashusita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Neither party contends that any material facts are in dispute and thus this matter is appropriate for summary judgment. Both rely on Stipulation II, the terms of which I concur lend themselves to resolution of this Motion as a matter of law. A consensual stipulation in a federal proceeding is interpreted according to general principles of contract construction. USX Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 130 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Royster Co., 132 B.R. 684, 687-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). Under these principles, where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the document itself to determine the parties' intent. Royster, 132 B.R. at 688.
There is no disagreement that under the terms of paragraph 5 of Stipulation II that the automatic stay was to have been reimposed when Debtor made the Payment. Debtor made the Payment and presumably the stay was reimposed. However, when Bankruptcy Case I was dismissed, the stay was terminated by operation of bankruptcy law. See Lomas Nettleton Co. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 24 B.R. 832, 833 n. 2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that the automatic stay is terminated upon the dismissal of a case); see also Lugo v. De Jesus Saez (In re De Jesus Saez), 721 F.2d 848, 851 (1st Cir. 1983); Frank v. Gulf States Fin. Co. (In re Frank), 254 B.R. 368, 369 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000)
Debtor appears to recognize that paragraph 5 of the Stipulation II offers her no protection since the bankruptcy case was dismissed and there was no longer an automatic stay of foreclosure. Rather she reads paragraph 6 as expressing Lender's contractual undertaking not to proceed with foreclosure on November 12th if the Payment is made. I respectfully disagree. Paragraph 6 merely states what will happen if Debtor fails to make payment, i.e., the sheriff's sale proceeds forward. Paragraph 6 does not provide for what will happen in the event Debtor does make payment. That is addressed in paragraph 5, i.e., the stay shall be reimposed. In short, paragraph 6 does not indicate an agreement by Lender to forbear from proceeding with the sheriff's sale if Debtor's bankruptcy case was dismissed as occurred here simply because Debtor made the Payment.
Debtor's construction makes little sense. Since Stipulation II only addresses the November 12th sale, at best it would provide a one month deferral of foreclosure, an objective that would hardly have been in anyone's mind in negotiating a bankruptcy stipulation.
In construing a contract, the agreement must be interpreted as a whole, and the words given their ordinary meaning. E.g., Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 947 (3d Cir. 1997). The various provisions must be examined in pertinent context rather than in isolation as Debtor has done in this instance. Accordingly I conclude that paragraph 6 must be read with paragraph 5 in light of the common purpose and intent of the agreement which was to reflect the terms and conditions of the parties' settlement of the Lender's motion for relief from stay. Stipulation II makes clear that Debtor was in default of Stipulation I by failing to pay certain agreed post-petition arrears and that as a consequence the stay had been lifted to allow Lender to foreclose. Lender agreed to the reimposition of the stay of the bankruptcy case if the Payment was made and current taxes and insurance premiums paid but made clear that if the Payment was not made by the continued sheriff sale date, that sale would proceed. While perhaps not the most artfully drafted document, the intention of the parties expressed therein is clear to the Court.
Stipulations such as this document are commonplace in bankruptcy cases where rather than litigate, mortgagees generally prefer to give a debtor a further opportunity for cure with the certainty that upon a further default there will be no further barrier to exercising their state law remedies.
Thus it is not the dismissal of the bankruptcy case and loss of the protection of the automatic stay which dictates the outcome here but rather the terms of the Stipulation II. Debtor reads terms into the Stipulation II that simply do not exist. That documents does not evidence an undertaking by Lender not to foreclose under the circumstances that it did. Lender's sole agreement was to allow the reimposition of the automatic stay if the Debtor performed her obligations under Stipulation II. That agreement was fulfilled. Since Stipulation II did not act to prohibit the sheriff's sale from proceeding under applicable state law notwithstanding Debtor's compliance with the agreement to secure reimposition of the automatic stay, Lender was free to pursue the November 12th sheriff's sale and Debtor has no basis to claim any breach of their agreement that could give rise to an attack on that sale.
If a stipulation provides that it will be enforceable post-dismissal, it will survive the dismissal of the bankruptcy case. See, e.g., In re AMC Realty Corp., 270 B.R. 132, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stipulation provided that the dismissal of the case would not affect the validity and continued effect of the stipulation).
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall be entered.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of July 2004, upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Washington Mutual, as successor-in-interest to Fleet Mortgage Corp., to the Complaint of the debtor Barbara Young, after notice and hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion;
It is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Motion is GRANTED.