RICHARD ENSLEN, District Judge
In accordance with the Opinion filed this day,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Enforcement (Dkt. No. 160) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Approval of Payment of Attorneys' Fees (Dkt. No. 178) is GRANTED.
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Mary Scott's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Defendant Metropolitan Health Corporation's Motion to approve Payment of Attorney Fees. On May 28, 2004, Plaintiff filed her Motion seeking payment by Defendant Metropolitan Health Corporation ("Metropolitan") of her expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs. On June 11, 2004, Metropolitan filed its Response as well as a separate Motion seeking the Court's approval of a payment of attorneys' fees directly to Plaintiff's attorneys.
Plaintiff's Motion cites what she sees as a litany of abuses by Metropolitan; according to her, Defendant has acted with nothing but "delays, failures, non-responses, and refusals" (Pl.'s Br., p. 5). Plaintiff points to the large numbers of offers and counteroffers with respect to attorneys' fees made as evidence that Defendant has been dragging its feet; however, such negotiation is to be expected in a case such as this one, and in fact a quick and easy resolution might suggest that one side or the other was not serving as a zealous advocate for its client. Plaintiff disingenuously claims to have "discounted" her request considerably; however, further scrutiny shows that many of these "discounts" arose from the removal of validly contested fees (e.g., Plaintiff's removal of fees incurred in resolving an internal dispute over attorneys' fees with her law firm). Plaintiff seems to believe that she should be rewarded for participating in standard negotiations and that Defendant should blindly accede to her demands. The Court finds her claims of shock and dismay to be disingenuous at best and will therefore deny her request for enforcement.
Defendant Metropolitan, on the other hand makes essentially two argument in its Response and Motion: first, it argues that it should be allowed to pay fees directly to the law firms involved; second, it argues that it should not be required to pay any fees to the law firm of Honigman, Miller, Schwartz and Cohn, LLP ("Honigman") because Honigman represented Metropolitan at the same time it was representing Plaintiff against Metropolitan in this suit.
The Court agrees with Defendant that it should be allowed to pay attorneys' fees directly to the law firms that represented Plaintiff in this case. Such payments in qui tam cases were expressly authorized in United States ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d 574, 579 (9th Cir. 1996), which reversed a district court's order to a defendant to pay attorneys' fees directly to the plaintiff. The court reasoned that, even though the attorney has no right to fees until the plaintiff demands them from the defendant, his right to those fees vests once the plaintiff exercises her power to demand the fees. Id. at 578. The court added that, "[i]n the qui tam arena, it is even more clear that attorneys' fees must go to the attorneys rather than to the plaintiff," because any other finding would perpetrate a wrong upon the government. Id. However, while the Court may allow a plaintiff's low firm to reach a separate agreement with a defendant over attorneys' fees, it should not require them to do so.
In this case, one firm, Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, P.C. ("Sommers Schwartz"), reached an agreement with Defendant regarding a separate payment by Defendant to Sommers Schwartz for attorneys' fees. The Court finds nothing improper about this agreement under Virani and therefore will allow Defendant to make its payment directly to Sommers Schwartz. Another firm, Frank, Haron, Weiner, Navarro, ("Frank Haron"), has not agreed to receive a direct payment from Defendant, and the Court will not require it to do so.
Defendant argues that the Court should deny fees to Honigman because, at the same time Honigman was representing Plaintiff in the instant case, Honigman was also representing Defendant in another lawsuit. The Court finds that this alleged conflict of interest is one that can properly be handled by the Attorney Grievance Commission. Mich. R. of Prof. Conduct 8.3(a). Although Defendant urges the Court to exercise its powers under Local Civil Rule 83(k), this power is discretionary, and the Court sees no need to involve itself in this issue at this time.
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the federal cases to which it cites do not require the Court to debar Honigman from receiving any fee simply because of a conflict of interest. The case In re Paine, 14 B.R. 272, 274 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 1981) prohibited an attorney from receiving fees based on a Bankruptcy Rule prohibiting an attorney from representing both a debtor and her unsecured creditors. The case United States ex rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994) did not exclude an attorneys' fee at all, but merely suggested that a district judge may wish to reduce an attorneys' fee if the attorney violated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Although Defendant also cites to various state law cases, the Court finds such cases to be irrelevant to this matter, which is based solely on federal law. Because Defendant has cited no valid authority explicitly requiring or even authorizing the Court to remove an attorneys' fee due to a conflict of interest, the Court will not undertake this drastic measure.
In conclusion, the Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that Defendant Metropolitan must pay attorneys' fees directly to her rather than her attorneys when Metropolitan reaches a separate agreement with those attorneys. Although both sides request further action by the Court, the Court finds intervention is not necessary at this time in order to resolve the outstanding issues regarding attorneys' fees. The Court further finds that neither side should be rewarded for its contentious behavior, unwillingness to negotiate, and eagerness to rely on the Court to resolve every dispute. Consequently, the Court denies Plaintiff's requests for fees and costs incurred in the resolution of attorneys' fees issues. Plaintiff's Motion for Enforcement is denied, and Defendant's Motion for Approval is granted. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall be issued.