Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The order of fact-finding and disposition was entered upon the mother's alleged default in appearing at the fact-finding and dispositional hearings. However, the order dated June 28, 2002, is brought up for review on the appeal from the order of factfinding and disposition ( see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]; Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). "Appellate review is not precluded because the mother may obtain review of `matters which were the subject of contest below'" ( Matter of Daquan Malik B., 6 AD3d 428, quoting James v. Powell, 19 NY2d 249, 256 n 3 [1967]; Matter of Kindra B., 296 AD2d 456, 457).
The determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is within the sound discretion of the Family Court ( see Matter of Samaria Ann B., 293 AD2d 532; Matter of Latisha I., 238 AD2d 340). A party seeking to vacate such an order must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Daquan Malik B., supra; Matter of Tiffany L., 294 AD2d 365, 366). We agree with the Family Court that the mother's conclusory, unsupported allegations failed to demonstrate either of these requisite elements ( see Matter of Glenna Artanna Patricia J-P., 303 AD2d 588; Matter of James Edward M., III, 250 AD2d 685).
The mother's due process and equal protection claims are unpreserved for appellate review ( see Matter of Female D., 296 AD2d 408; Matter of Tiffany A., 295 AD2d 288; Matter of Derrick T.M., 286 AD2d 938) and, in any event, are without merit.