J. LEON HOLMES, District Judge
On the 1st day of September, 2004, the Court held a pretrial conference by telephone. Each party was represented by counsel. Among other things, the Court heard argument on Plaintiffs' motion in limine (Docket #58), and Mendez's and Roadway's first and second motions in limine (Docket #54 and #68). As stated hereinafter more specifically, Plaintiff's motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part; Mendez's and Roadway's first motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part; and Mendez's and Roadway's second motion in limine is granted.
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine
1. Plaintiffs first move in limine to prevent the jury from knowing that the motion in limine had been filed. Without opposition, that part of Plaintiffs' motion in limine is GRANTED.
2. Second, Plaintiffs move in limine to preclude testimony that Robert Mendez was issued no traffic citation as a result of the accident in question. Without opposition, that part of Plaintiffs' motion in limine is GRANTED.
3. Third, Plaintiffs move in limine to exclude testimony that Steve Jackson or other members of Jackson Reconstruction may have been employed by the firm of Boswell, Tucker, Brewster, Smith Davis on other cases. Steve Jackson is an accident reconstruction expert whom Mendez and Roadway intend to call as an expert witness. Defendants contend that it is premature to determine whether such testimony may be relevant, and that a determination of the relevancy of such testimony should be postponed until cross-examination of Steve Jackson of Jackson Reconstruction has been completed. Counsel for Mendez and Roadway has stated that he will not question Mr. Jackson on direct examination regarding whether he has been employed by Boswell, Tucker, Brewster, Smith Davis on other cases. The Court agrees that it is premature to determine whether testimony that Steve Jackson has been employed by Boswell, Tucker, Brewster, Smith Davis in the past. Therefore, that part of Plaintiffs' motion in limine is DENIED.
4. Finally, Plaintiffs move in limine to exclude questioning regarding personal items found in the Lopez vehicle, including $8,500 in cash, a small electronic scale, and horn-shaped jewelry. Defendants argue that evidence of these personal items is evidence from which a jury could infer that Mr. and Mrs. Lopez were engaged in illegal drug smuggling. Defendants contend that this evidence is relevant to the issue of what moral training Mr. Lopez might have given his children, as well as his habits of industry and sobriety, both of which the jury may consider under AMI 2216 if those portions of the instruction are given to the jury. The briefs and arguments of counsel have not called the Court's attention to any evidence that Mr. Lopez had ever been convicted, or even accused, of smuggling illegal drugs or of using them. Defendants do not contend that illegal drugs were found in the vehicle. At this stage in the proceeding, it appears to the Court that the claim that Mr. Lopez was engaged in smuggling illegal drugs is speculative at best. The evidence cited by the Defendants would not support a finding that Mr. Lopez had engaged in smuggling of illegal drugs. Moreover, the Court finds that the danger of unfair prejudice from this evidence substantially outweighs any probative value that this evidence may have. Therefore, this portion of Plaintiffs' motion in limine is GRANTED.
Mendez's and Roadway's First Motion in Limine
1. First, Mendez and Roadway first move in limine to exclude evidence that Mendez was involved in a minor accident after the date of the accident in question while he was driving for another motor carrier. Without objection, that portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED.
2. Second, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude evidence that Mendez had a motor vehicle accident prior to the accident in question. Without objection, that portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED.
3. Third, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude evidence that Mendez had a speeding violation in his personal car seven years before the accident in question and has had approximately three other speeding violations in his lifetime. Without objection, that portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED.
4. Fourth, Mendez and Roadway move to exclude evidence that there were small amounts of a low-grade radioactive material (of the type used in medical procedures) and a small amount of flammable liquid in the Roadway truck at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs and James Construction Group, L.L.C., contend that evidence of this small amount of low-grade radioactive material and flammable liquid is relevant because Roadway allegedly failed to inform Mr. Mendez that he was carrying this material, and that he would have driven more slowly and more carefully had he been so informed. There is no claim that this material caused any injury or damage to any party. The Court finds that evidence regarding this material is not relevant, and that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs any probative value that this evidence may have.
5. Fifth, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude evidence that Mendez takes medications to control his blood pressure and his acid reflux, and that he was taking such medications on the date of the accident. Without opposition, that portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED.
6. Sixth, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude testimony by Davie Franklin that the Roadway truck was going about 50 miles per hour when it collided with the Lopez vehicle. Mr. Franklin was in a position to observe the accident. Although Mr. Franklin admits that he does not have a lot of experience at estimating the speeds of vehicles, at this stage the Court cannot say that his testimony as to the speed of the Roadway truck would be inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 701. Therefore, that portion of the motion in limine is DENIED.
7. Seventh, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude evidence that any party has made any offers to settle or pay property damages to any other person involved in the accident, including persons not parties to this case. Without opposition, that portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED.
8. Eighth, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude evidence that George Gouldsby told Davie Franklin that he did not hear any sound before impact. Without opposition, that portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED.
9. Ninth, Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude testimony from Davie Franklin as to whether his or his son's brake lights were on while they were stopped at the temporary ramp. Plaintiffs' counsel stated on the record that they do not intend to ask Mr. Franklin as to whether his or his son's brake lights were on. They do intend to ask Mr. Franklin whether he and his son were stopped at the stop sign, whether he had his foot on the brake pedal, and whether he has any reason to believe that the brake lights in the two vehicles were inoperative. Mendez and Roadway have no objection to those questions. Therefore, this portion of the motion in limine is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to exclude testimony by Davie Franklin that his and his son's brake lights were on while they were stopped at the temporary ramp, but Mr. Franklin will be allowed to testify that he and his son were stopped at the stop sign, that he had his foot on the brake pedal, and that he knows of no reason to believe that the brake lights on either vehicle were inoperative.
10. Tenth, Mendez and Roadway move to exclude any testimony from Davie Franklin that he did not see the Roadway truck attempt to stop or that he did not see any brake lights illuminated on the Roadway truck. That portion of the motion in limine will be DENIED. Mr. Franklin will be allowed to testify as to what he did and did not see. If he testifies that he did not see something that he was in no position to see, the fact that he was not in a position to see it may be brought out on cross-examination.
Mendez's and Roadway's Second Motion in Limine
Mendez and Roadway move in limine to exclude testimony by Dr. Johannes Gruenwald of the cost of a surgical procedure that would remove the rod and screws that have been placed in the left leg of Rosa Lopez. Dr. Gruenwald could not say with a reasonable degree of certainty that this procedure will be required in the future. Accordingly, the foundation has not been established for telling the jury what the cost of the procedure would be. Therefore, Mendez's and Roadway's second motion in limine is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.