SWEENEY, J.
A license in real property is a personal privilege to act or use property without actually possessing any estate or interest in the property. A licensee is privileged to enter upon the land with the consent of the possessor of the land for his or her own purpose rather than for the purpose of the possessor of the land Here, an employer was granted a license by the possessor of a building, a parish hall, to use it as a school during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. The licensee's employee was injured when she fell from an unguarded attic/loft. The trial court summarily dismissed her complaint concluding that the hazard was open and obvious. We agree. The danger was open and obvious. And the licensor had no legal duty to the plaintiffs. We would further conclude that even if the arrangement were a lease and the duty were one of reasonable care, the possessor of the property would not have breached any duty. We therefore affirm the summary dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.
FACTS
Sharon V. Miller fell from an unguarded loft. She was employed by the Northeast Washington Early Childhood Program, a program of the Northeast Washington Rural Resources Development Association. The fall occurred at the parish hall of Sacred Heart Catholic Church in Springdale, Washington. Ms. Miller's employer occupied that hall during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. The arrangement was described as a `lease':
Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee leases from Lessor access to and the use of the Parish Hall of Sacred Heart Catholic Church at 110 South Second Street, Springdale, Washington 99173. Lessee shall have access to the restroom and kitchen facilities located in the building. Access shall be during weekdays from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. During non-school hours and non-school days, Lessor will retain use of such facilities.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 155. The attic/loft area is a space between the kitchen ceiling and the roof of the church. Ms. Miller was a teacher and the property was used for classes for Head Start students.
In order to access the loft, Ms. Miller stood on one of the school's child-size chairs. From there she climbed onto the kitchen stove. She then climbed onto an adjacent refrigerator. She finally climbed onto a microwave oven on top of the refrigerator into the loft. She fell through the opening to the loft while reaching for a box.
She sued the owner of the property, the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, for damages based upon a number of legal theories, all of which are predicated on her assertion that the landowner had an obligation to protect her from the hazard posed by this loft. Specifically, she argues that the opening should have been fitted with a protective rail. The trial judge granted the landowner's motion for summary judgment, concluding it had no duty because the condition complained of was open and obvious.
DISCUSSION
A cause of action for negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wn.2d 479, 488, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989). This threshold determination — whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care — is a question of law for the courts. Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assocs., 116 Wn.2d 217, 220, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991).
The facts material to our disposition are undisputed. The only question before us is this landowner's duty based upon these facts. It is a question properly disposed of by summary judgment. And our review is de novo. Beebe v. Moses, 113 Wn. App. 464, 469 n. 1, 54 P.3d 188 (2002) (Sweeney, J., concurring); Schreiner v. City of Spokane, 74 Wn. App. 617, 621, 874 P.2d 883 (1994). A landowner's duty in Washington still turns on the legal status of the plaintiff, i.e., trespasser, licensee, or invitee, when she enters the land Botka v. Estate of Hoerr, 105 Wn. App. 974, 982-83, 21 P.3d 723 (2001).
The document authorizing Ms. Miller's employer to use the parish hall, while denominated a `LEASE,' established no more than a license. A license is a personal privilege to enter land without possessing any estate or interest in the land Black's Law Dictionary 938 (8th ed. 2004). As distinct from a lease, which conveys exclusive possession, a license merely grants the use of another's land Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 103 Wn. App. 169, 183-84, 11 P.3d 839 (2000). A license may be established by a written agreement. Singleton v. Jackson, 85 Wn. App. 835, 839-40, 935 P.2d 644 (1997). The landowner's duty is created not by the label, but by the legal relationship created by the agreement.
Here, Ms. Miller's employer was licensed to enter and use this property between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. weekdays. The landowner granted use of the parish hall, including restrooms and kitchen, during certain hours, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., during weekdays. But the grant to Ms. Miller's employer was `access to and the use of' during certain specified periods of the day and week. CP at 155. The landowner did not grant exclusive use of these premises. Head Start was then the landowner's licensee.
Washington has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 342 (1965) to define a landowner's responsibility to a licensee for dangerous conditions on the land Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wn.2d 121, 133, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). The Restatement provides: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and
(b) he [or she] fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.
Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 342, at 210 (emphasis added). The landowner is not required to make the property safe for the licensee or to `affirmatively seek out and discover hidden dangers.' Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wn.2d 685, 689, 538 P.2d 517 (1975). The duty is simply one of reasonable care, where there is a known dangerous condition on the property which the licensee cannot reasonably be anticipated to discover or to realize the nature of the risk. If the danger is not readily discoverable, the landowner has a duty either to make the condition safe or to warn the licensee of the condition and its inherent risks. Id.
Here, there was no dangerous condition known to the landowner that was not equally obvious to Head Start and Ms. Miller. The landowner had no duty to inspect rafters, attics, and lofts inaccessible in the course of the anticipated use of the property and not within the scope of the license.
But even were we to assume a lease agreement here, Ms. Miller's claim of duty would still fail. First, the landlord's duty to the tenant's invitee (here Ms. Miller, the tenant's employee) is no greater than to the tenant. Frobig v. Gordon, 124 Wn.2d 732, 735, 881 P.2d 226 (1994). And if this agreement were a lease, it would be a commercial lease. The commercial landlord is liable to the tenant solely for latent or hidden defects existing at the time of the commencement of the leasehold which the landlord knew about, but concealed from the tenant. Id. Again, the `defect' complained of here is an unguarded loft/attic. The hazard, given the elevation of this space, was open, obvious, and in no way concealed.
Finally, even if the duty here were that of reasonable care as Ms. Miller contends, the court properly dismissed this cause of action. An attic with no stair, handhold, or handrail is an open and obvious danger. The landowner should not expect that a person will climb over stoves, countertops, refrigerators, and microwaves to access this area.
The court then properly dismissed Ms. Miller's complaint.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KATO, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur.