TROUTMAN v. ALTEC, LLC (S.D.Ind. 2004)

DAVID HAMILTON, District Judge

Plaintiff Roland Troutman alleges in this action that defendant Altec, LLC fired him in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2615, after he suffered a heart attack and missed work. (Troutman has also named as a defendant Altec human resources manager Susan Waller, but the court refers here to both defendants as "Altec.") Altec has moved for summary judgment, but the court finds that the motion must be denied.

Summary judgment may be granted only when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when all record evidence is considered in the light reasonably most favorable to the opposing party, giving him the benefit of all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is not a procedure that can be used to evaluate the credibility of conflicting evidence. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment for defense: "On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.").

By way of background, during July 2002, Troutman took a vacation. While he was away, Altec fired him for being absent without excuse. Troutman returned to the company and showed Altec and Waller that his absences had been covered by his vacation. According to Troutman, Waller was "visibly disappointed" by this news but rescinded his termination. Troutman Aff. ¶ 3.

Then Troutman had a medical problem in early October 2002. For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, Altec and the court assume that Troutman had a "serious health condition" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(11) 2612(a)(1)(D), that he notified Altec of his absences for medical reasons, and that his doctor's excuses were sufficient to meet the certification requirements of the FMLA.

Viewed in the light reasonably most favorable to plaintiff Troutman, the evidence shows that on Friday, October 4, 2002, he worked a full shift but was not feeling well at the end of his shift. Before leaving, he told Altec that he was going to the hospital, where he stayed for two nights. He suffered a mild heart attack during this time. His doctor told him not to return to work until she gave her permission. On both October 5th and 7th, Troutman had family members call Altec to notify management that he would be absent for medical reasons.

Troutman did not appear for work again until December 2, 2002. At the entrance of Altec, he was told that he had been fired effective October 4, 2002 for job abandonment as a no-call, no-show. Altec denies that Troutman gave it any notice of his medical absence, though Altec recognizes that the issue is disputed and that proper notice of the FMLA leave must be assumed for purposes of summary judgment. Based only on these facts and factual disputes, the case presents genuine issues of material fact as to whether Altec fired Troutman in violation of the FMLA for taking protected medical leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

Altec contends, however, that it is entitled to summary judgment because of a gap between two different medical excuses. On November 12, 2002, Dr. Beasley wrote a medical release stating that Troutman had been under her care from October 11 to November 12, 2002, and that he could return to work on November 13, 2002. On November 27, 2002, Dr. Bowman (of the same practice group) wrote a medical release stating that Troutman had been under his care from November 15 to November 27, 2002, and that Troutman could not return to work until November 27, 2002.

Altec bases its motion on the two-day gap between the medical excuses, November 13th and 14th. According to Altec, Troutman's absences on those days were not excused by either medical release: one had already ended and the other had not yet begun. Altec contends that Troutman had so few points left for absences that an unexcused absence for either day would have warranted automatic termination of his employment.

Assuming, as the court must at this stage, that Troutman notified Altec on October 5th and 7th of his medical absence, if Altec had followed its normal policies, it would have exercised its right under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2613, to require Troutman to obtain medical certification of the basis for his absence. Under normal policies, Altec's Waller would have notified Troutman that he needed to provide such a certification. See Waller Dep. at 29-30. Waller also testified that if had complied with its policies (as it should have, given Troutman's evidence that he provided sufficient notice of his leave under the FMLA), Altec would have handled the entire matter differently. Waller Dep. at 72.

Altec never implemented those policies and never asked for the medical certification, even though one version of Altec's records listed Troutman's leave for October 11th, 14th, and 15th as "FMLA." It appears that the document was later altered to "X" out those references to the FMLA on those dates. Compare Pl. Ex. 8 with Pl. Ex. 9. The record contains no explanation for the discrepancy. Along with other evidence of notice from Troutman, Exhibit 8 certainly seems to support an inference that Troutman notified Altec of the medical leave and that Altec viewed the leave as covered by the FMLA.

Thus, as the case is presented on summary judgment, the court must assume that whether or not Troutman showed up for work on November 13th and 14th had nothing to do with Altec's decision to fire him. The court must assume that Altec had already fired him effective October 4th, and that its firing was a violation of the FMLA. Accordingly, Altec's argument based on November 13th and 14th is based on a comparison of only arguable relevance. If Altec had complied with the FMLA — for example, by responding to the notice from Troutman's family by asking for medical documentation — it is reasonable to assume that a number of events might have occurred differently. There would have been more communication among Troutman, his doctors, and Altec, and quite possibly there would have been no gap in the medical excuses. For example, Altec has questioned (though not in its motion for summary judgment) whether the medical releases from Troutman's doctors were sufficient for purposes of the FMLA. Altec would certainly have been within its rights under § 2613 if it had demanded that Troutman obtain more detailed medical certifications from his doctors. However, "the proper course of action for an employer who receives inadequate medical certification is not termination. Instead, such an employer is under an obligation to provide the employee with a reasonable time in which to correct or amend their medical certification." Peter v. Lincoln Technical Institute, 255 F. Supp. 2d 417, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2002); 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) ("The employer shall advise an employee whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete, and provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any such deficiency."). If that had occurred, as the court must assume it should have if Altec had complied with the FMLA, Troutman would have been in a much better position to provide any relevant information that Altec needed. In any event, viewing the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to Troutman, whether he showed up for work on November 13th and 14th could be deemed immaterial because Altec had already fired him for earlier supposed violations of the attendance policy, and because the court must assume for now that Altec had already violated the FMLA by firing him.

In its briefs, Altec has repeatedly attacked the credibility of Troutman and his evidence, but those attacks are of course not the stuff of summary judgment. Altec's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. Trial remains scheduled for November 1, 2004.

So ordered.