Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish her guilt of murder in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05; People v. Gray, 86 NY2d 10; People v. Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a prosecution witness could be considered an accomplice as a matter of fact, whose testimony required corroboration. However, the subject witness was, at most, an "accessory after the fact," whose testimony needed no corroboration under CPL 60.22 ( People v. Dygert, 229 AD2d 735, 736; People v. Sacco, 199 AD2d 288, 289). Accordingly, an accomplice corroboration charge was not warranted ( see People v. Young, 235 AD2d 441, 442; People v. Brown, 221 AD2d 270, 271).