Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident ( see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). The affirmations of the plaintiff's physicians submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The findings of the physicians who treated the plaintiff immediately after the accident were vague and conclusory ( see Kauderer v. Penta, 261 AD2d 365; Carroll v. Jennings, 264 AD2d 494). Moreover, the findings of limitations in the cervical spine by the expert who examined the plaintiff for the first time 3½ years after the accident were refuted by the medical records that showed that the plaintiff had a "good range of motion" by mid-July of 2000, three years before the expert's examination.
The plaintiff failed to submit any competent medical evidence which would have supported a claim that she was unable to perform substantially all of her daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days as a result of the subject accident ( see Sainte-Aime v. Ho, 274 AD2d 569; Jackson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 273 AD2d 200; Greene v. Miranda, 272 AD2d 441; Arshad v. Gomer, 268 AD2d 450; Bennett v. Reed, 263 AD2d 800; DiNunzio v. County of Suffolk, 256 AD2d 498, 499).
Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.