MICELI v. ST. FARM MUT. AUTO. INSURANCE COMPANY

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

132.

Attorney(S)

Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale ( Stuart M. Bodoff, Evan H. Krinick and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), and Hagelin Bischof, LLC, for appellant. Barth, Sullivan Behr, LLP, Buffalo ( Laurence D. Behr of counsel), for respondent.

Judges

Albert Rosenblatt
Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick
Judith S. Kaye
Susan Phillips Read
Victoria A. Graffeo

Acts

Civil Practice Law And Rules — Accelerated Judgment — Motion for summary judgment

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an appeal, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department. The Appellate Division had affirmed a summary judgment granted to the plaintiff by the Supreme Court, Erie County. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a motion for summary judgment filed more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed, without showing good cause for the delay, complies with the statutory requirements under CPLR 3212(a).
Whether the merits of a summary judgment motion alone can constitute good cause to excuse late filing beyond the 120-day statutory deadline.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Respondent's Arguments

The plaintiff did not dispute that the summary judgment motion was filed late, beyond the 120-day deadline.
The plaintiff offered no excuse or showing of good cause for the late filing.
The plaintiff argued only that the motion was meritorious on its face.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Brill v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 648	Summary judgment motions must be timely filed or supported by good cause to excuse delay; merits alone do not excuse late filing.	The Court relied on Brill to reaffirm that statutory deadlines are mandatory and that allowing merit alone to excuse delay would undermine the statutory scheme and encourage last-minute motions.
Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118	Court-ordered time frames are mandatory requirements, not optional guidelines.	Used to emphasize the importance of adhering to procedural deadlines, reinforcing the mandatory nature of timely motions.
Miceli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 903	This precedent was reversed by the Court.	The Court reversed the Appellate Division's affirmation of summary judgment that was based on this precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court emphasized that statutory time frames for filing summary judgment motions, specifically the 120-day deadline after the note of issue, are mandatory and not subject to waiver or circumvention by relying solely on the merits of the motion. The Court referenced its recent precedent in Brill v. City of New York, where it rejected the argument that the substantive merit of a motion could constitute good cause to excuse a late filing. The Court reasoned that allowing such an exception would undermine the Legislature's clear intent to enforce timely motions and would encourage delaying tactics that burden court resources. The plaintiff's failure to offer any excuse or good cause for the late filing led the Court to reverse the Appellate Division's order granting summary judgment without addressing the merits of the motion itself.

Holding and Implications

The Court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

This decision directly affects the parties by denying summary judgment to the plaintiff due to procedural noncompliance. The Court did not consider the merits of the motion, reinforcing the principle that procedural rules regarding timing are strictly enforced. No new precedent beyond reaffirming the binding nature of Brill v. City of New York was established.

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MARY MICELI, Respondent, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied.

Barely five months ago, in Brill v. City of New York ( 2 N.Y.3d 648), this Court reversed an award of summary judgment for defendant, without considering its merit, on the ground that the motion, made more than 120 days after note of issue was filed, failed to comply with the statutory requirement that "good cause" be shown for the late filing. We determined that, if the merit of the motion itself constituted good cause, the statutory deadline would be circumvented and the practice of delaying such motions until the eve of trial encouraged. As the Legislature clearly specified, summary judgment motions should be timely made, or good cause shown.

As we made clear in Brill, and underscore here, statutory time frames — like court-ordered time frames ( see Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118) — are not options, they are requirements, to be taken seriously by the parties. Too many pages of the Reports, and hours of the courts, are taken up with deadlines that are simply ignored.

Plaintiff does not dispute that her motion for summary judgment was made more than 120 days after note of issue was filed, and offers no excuse for her failure to comply with CPLR 3212 (a), arguing only that her motion is meritorious. This was precisely defendant's position before us in Brill. To countenance plaintiff's position here would require us to overturn our own recent precedent. This we refuse to do, and we therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division awarding summary judgment to plaintiff, without considering the merit of the motion.

Order reversed, etc.