Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
The defendant contends that the trial court violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against double jeopardy when it vacated its order setting aside the verdict and directing a new trial, and reinstated the guilty verdict, after determining that the prior order was the product of a fraud perpetrated on the court. Since the order setting aside the verdict and directing a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence was not the equivalent of an adjudication of factual innocence, the reinstatement of the verdict did not violate the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against double jeopardy ( see generally CPL 40.30; 450.20 [3]; People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 117-120; People v. Dorta, 56 AD2d 607).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are without merit.