PER CURIAM
We grant defendant's application for re-hearing. Atlanta Specialty Insurance Company has filed an application for rehearing asserting six assignments of error committed by this Court. We find five assignments of error asserted by the defendant to be without merit. We address defendant, Atlanta Specialty Insurance Company's assertion that this Court misapplied La. R.S. 32:124, for clarification.
In interpreting La. R.S. 32:124, the black letter of the law refers specifically to vehicles entering or crossing a highway from a private road. La. R.S. 32:124 La. R.S. 32:124 provides:
"The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road, driveway, alley or building, shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or driveway, and shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid collision, and shall yield the right of way to all approaching vehicles so close as to constitute immediate hazard."
The record establishes that Ducombs stopped her vehicle immediately prior to turning onto the highway, although there was no stop sign at the time of the incident. The record also establishes that Ducombs yielded the right of way to all approaching vehicles so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Ducombs testified that while at a complete stop she looked to see "if anything was coming and nothing was blocking" her view. In Schexnayder v. Guillor, et al, 280 So.2d 239, 242 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), this Court held that after the unfavored driver has completed his turn (right or left) there comes a point (e.g., certainly, a mile down the road) at which the turn is causally unrelated to a rear-ending. In the present case the trial court ruled that defendant, Turner, was negligent in causing the accident, that plaintiff, Ducombs had comparative fault in the amount of 45%, and awarded damages.
We have reviewed the record and find no manifest error by the trial court in determining that Turner was 55% at fault and Ducombs was 45% at fault. The record establishes that both parties were unable to see the other until after the turn by Ducombs was completed. Irrespective of the misstatement that La. R.S. 32:124 was not applicable because the plaintiff Ducombs was exiting from a public street, our finding that it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that both parties were at fault and apportioned accordingly is unaffected.
Defendant asserts in its sixth assignment of error that this court erred in modifying the general damage award rendered by the trial court on February 25, 2003. The Court of Appeal will review only issues which are submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise. Uniform Rules of Louisiana Court of Appeal, Rule 1 — 3. Based on our finding that the trial court erred by substantively amending the February 25, 2003 judgment without granting the motion for new trial, the March 28, 2003 amended judgment of $27,200 is an absolute nullity. Francis v. Lafon Nursing Home of the Holy Family, 2002-1863 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/19/03), 840 So.2d 1281. Therefore, this Court vacated the trial court's March 28, 2003 amended judgment and reinstated the February 25, 2003 judgment rendered by the trial court.
Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2164, which provides that the appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal and proper upon the record on appeal, we found that the trial court was manifestly erneous in evaluating the quantum for plaintiff's general damages in the amount of $19,000, reflected in the February 25, 2003 reinstated judgment. Although the record establishes that the trial court attempted to correct this error by rendering an amended judgment in the amount of $27,2000, the trial court's failure to grant the motion for new trial resulted in this Court vacating the March 28, 2003 amended judgment and reinstating the original judgment rendered February 25, 2003.
In the interest of justice and judicial economy, this Court assessed whether the trial court abused its discretion in the re-instated February judgment, awarding general damages to Ducombs in the amount of $19,000. With regard to the award of damages, there must be a showing that the trier of fact abused the great discretion accorded in awarding damages. Napolitano, et al. v. F.S.P., Inc., et al., 2000-1602, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/05/01), 797 So.2d 111, 114. This Court held that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in rendering such an award for general damages based on the record before us; in light of pre-existing case law, and the facts of the case at bar. Therefore, the quantum was adjusted to reflect what was just.
Furthermore, defendant's assertion that this Court acted inconsistently by characterizing the quantum award as reasonable and simultaneously amending the award as unjust is mistaken. This Court's reference to the trial court's award for damages as "reasonable and consistent with the injuries" Ducombs suffered, was in relation to the March 28, 2003 amended judgment rendered by the trial court, which this Court was required to vacate as an absolute nullity, not to the February 5, 2003 judgment, which this Court amended.
We acknowledge that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not give the appellate court the express authority to grant or deny motions for new trial, absent such a motion being joined, or alternatively prayed for, with a motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
La. C.C.P. art. 2087 provides:
An order of appeal is premature if granted before the court disposes of all timely filed motions for new trial. . . . The order becomes effective upon the denial of such motions.
Therefore, we vacate our amended judgment in the amount of $27,200, reinstate the trial court's February 25, 2003 judgment in the amount of $19,000, and remand the case back to the trial court to dispose of the motion for new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the majority opinion in Ducombs v. Turner et al., affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this matter to the trial court to resolve the outstanding motion for new trial.