URSULA UNGARO-BENAGES, District Judge
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion to File a Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed October 4, 2004.
THE COURT has considered the motion and the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. On November 12, 2003, the City of Aventura ("Defendant" or "the City") City Commission voted to deny Plaintiff Williams Island Synagogue's request for a conditional use permit which would have allowed Plaintiff to operate a synagogue in a 6,000 square foot space located on the first level of the parking garage located at 2600 Island Boulevard. On February 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed the pending two-count complaint, seeking injunctive relief and damages against Defendant pursuant to both the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 ("RFRA"), Fla. Stat. § 761. On March 10, 2004, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action, that Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that RLUIPA and RFRA were unconstitutional to the extent that they operate to invalidate zoning regulations of general, nondiscriminatory applicability. On May 6, 2004, the Court entered an order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court found first that Plaintiff has standing to maintain this action because the complaint alleges that the November 12, 2003 denial of the conditional use permit resulted in a redressible violation of Plaintiff's rights under RLUIPA. The Court then concluded that Plaintiff's substantial burden claim stated a cognizable claim after finding persuasive authority for the proposition that the denial of a zoning variance may force religious institutions, as a result of increased membership and under certain circumstances, to forego their religious precepts in violation of RLUIPA. The Court then concluded that Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim survived Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Plaintiff stated a cognizable claim that it was required to submit to a certification process which did not apply to comparable private organizations, such as the 2600 Island Boulevard Condominium Association. Finally, the Court rejected Defendant's challenges to RLUIPA and RFRA based on the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 2004 WL 84527 *25 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2004), that RLUIPA does not exceed Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and does not abridge state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. On June 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing (1) that Defendant's denial of Plaintiff's conditional use permit application has imposed a "substantial burden" on Plaintiff's exercise of its religious beliefs, as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); (2) that Defendant has treated Plaintiff and non-party the 2600 Island Boulevard Condominium Association on less than equal terms in violation of § 2000cc(b)(1); and (3) that RLUIPA and RFRA are constitutional. On June 21, 2004, the Court entered an order requiring response, which observed that Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment prematurely forced the Court to consider whether Defendant's decision-making process conformed with these statutes as discovery in this matter had not been completed. The Court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to withdraw this motion, and advised Plaintiff that failure to withdraw this motion would bar Plaintiff from filing subsequent motions for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 7.1.C.2 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which prohibits "[t]he practice of filing multiple motions for partial summary judgment which are collectively intended to dispose of the case." On June 22, 2004, Plaintiff advised the Court that it would not withdraw its motion for partial summary judgment. On August 3, 2004, the Court entered an order denying Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.
Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a second motion for partial summary judgment in order to argue that the holding in the recently decided case Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 2004 WL 1944456 (Fla. Sep. 2, 2004), compels the conclusion that Defendant's actions constitute a substantial burden on Plaintiff's free exercise of its religious beliefs in violation of RFRA. Aside from stating that this case represents an intervening change in the governing state law, Plaintiff's motion does not show cause why Plaintiff should be allowed to file a second motion for partial summary judgment notwithstanding the bar imposed by Rule 7.1.C.2 and the Court's order of June 21, 2004. The local rules provide parties with a single opportunity to file a motion for summary judgment in order to dispose of all or part of a complaint or counterclaim. Plaintiff was placed on notice upon the filing of its first motion for partial summary judgment that its filing may have been precipitous. Plaintiff's decision to maintain that ultimately unsuccessful motion obliged Defendant and the Court to devote time and energy in responding to and adjudicating Plaintiff's motion. The bar imposed by the local rules, in part, protects the party opposing summary judgment and conserves judicial resources by preventing Plaintiff from filing a second (or third or fourth) motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second motion for partial summary judgment — in addition to avoiding any mention of the Court's earlier order requiring response — does not show cause why this bar should not operate in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion to File a Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED.