JENNINGS, JUDGE.
The plaintiff, Rainbow Advertising Sales Corporation (Rainbow), filed a three-count complaint on April 12, 2004. Therein Rainbow alleges that the defendant, Deluxe Cleaners Incorporated, d/b/a Classic Cleaners (Classic), failed, refused and neglected to pay the amount owed under two contracts for advertising made by the parties and that, as a result, Classic has been unjustly enriched.
On May 5, 2004, Classic filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency of process and/or service of process. As required by Practice Book § 10-31, Classic filed a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. Rainbow has timely filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that service was properly made and that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.
On May 14, 2004, Rainbow filed a motion to strike the appearance of Classic on the grounds that a corporation cannot file a pro se appearance, which was granted. Classic is now represented by an attorney. On July 12, 2004, Classic filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that a provision of the contract gave New York, and not Connecticut, jurisdiction. That motion was denied on August 2, 2004. Presently before the court is the personal jurisdiction issue raised by the May 5, 2004 motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
"The grounds which maybe asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 10-31. "Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Debek, 210 Conn. 175, 179-80, 554 A.2d 728 (1989). "The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone . . . Where however . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346-47, 766 A.2d 400 (2001). "If a CT Page 16302 challenge to the courts personal jurisdiction is raised by a defendant either by a foreign corporation or by a nonresident individual, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction." Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 607, 674 A.2d 426 (1996).
Classic argues in support of its motion to dismiss that service was not made in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 52-57(a) and that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. In a sworn affidavit attached to Classic's motion to dismiss, it states that Peter Rallis is the designated statutory agent for service of process, President and Chief Executive Officer of Classic, and that Rallis did not receive personal or abode service as required by § 52-57(a).
Although Classic has relied exclusively on General Statutes § 52-57(a), it was properly served pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57(c). Subsection (c) states in relevant part that, "[i]n actions against a private corporation, service of process shall be made either upon . . . the secretary, . . . the person in charge of the business of the corporation or upon any person who is at the time of service in charge of the office of the corporation in the town in which its principal office or place of business is located." In the affidavit attached to its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, Classic describes itself as "a corporation duly organized and existing under the law of the State of Connecticut." Classic must therefore be served according to the Connecticut statutory provisions for service of a private corporation.
Classic relies on subsection (a) of the statute, which states the allowable methods for service of process upon an individual defendant. In the present case, Classic is not being sued in an individual capacity, but rather, as a private corporation.
In addition to General Statutes § 52-57(c), however, corporations can be served process under Connecticut law pursuant to General Statutes § 33-663. Subsection (c) approves of service on a corporation's statutory agent while also stating that this method of service "does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the required means, of serving a corporation." General Statutes § 33-663(c).
In a case where propriety and sufficiency of service was at issue, the court stated that "[i]n Connecticut, service of process on private corporations is governed by General Statutes §§ 33-663 and 52-57(c)." Nardella v. Norwich Inn Spa, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 990421516 (September 17, 1999, Zoarski, J.T.R.). In Nardella, when the plaintiff sought to go forward with her case despite her inability to successfully comply with service as prescribed by § 33-663, the court instead granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that "[a]lthough the Club named the wrong agent for service of process in its first motion to dismiss and has changed its agent for service of process several times, the plaintiff had other options CT Page 16303 available to her to serve the Club. See §§ 33-663(b) and 52-57(c)." Id. The two statutory methods described are not mutually exclusive and the plaintiffs can serve process on private corporations under Connecticut law with reference to either method.
The Constable's return of service, attached to the original complaint in the Court's file indicates that Stamford City Constable John F. Laydon made personal service upon Penny Rallis as the "person in charge Deluxe Cleaners, 543 Hope Street, Stamford, Conn.," on April 1, 2004. 543 Hope Street, Stamford, Connecticut is alleged in paragraph 2 of the complaint to be the principal place of business of the defendant Deluxe Cleaners, Inc., a Connecticut corporation doing business as Classic Cleaners. Classic has not denied that personal service was made upon Penny Rallis as the person who, at the time of service, was in charge of the office of the corporation at 543 Hope Street in Stamford, the town of the corporation's principal place of business. The well-pleaded facts and facts offered in the attached affidavits satisfy Rainbow's burden of proof that the court has personal jurisdiction over Classic by service in accordance with Section 52-57(c) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Classic's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is therefore denied.
The plaintiff has submitted with its memorandum of law copies of undisputed documentation from the Secretary of State's "Concord" database that Penny Rallis was also the secretary of the defendant corporation. As such officer service upon her would also be valid service on the corporation under Section 52-57(c).
SO ORDERED.
ALFRED JENNINGS, JR. JUDGE