LEWIS, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
The plaintiff, Holly Orr, a/k/a Holly A. Orr, filed a revised complaint dated December 2, 2003 against the defendants, Cecil N. Clark, Gerald Landry and United Parcel Service, Inc., in connection with a motor vehicle accident occurring in Greenwich on August 30, 2001, as a result of which the plaintiff claims that she sustained personal injuries. Counts three and four of the revised complaint allege statutory recklessness and common-law recklessness, respectively, against Clark, the driver of the vehicle that allegedly struck the rear of a vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.
The defendant, Clark, has filed motion #129 to strike counts three and four of the revised complaint on the ground of failure to plead sufficient facts in support of the plaintiff's claims of statutory recklessness and common-law recklessness, including a claim for punitive damages.
The motion to strike actually refers to striking counts four and five, an obvious typographical error.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). "[A motion to strike] does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[The court] take[s] the facts to be those alleged in the CT Page 18563 complaint . . . and . . . construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun, Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., supra, 292.
COUNT THREE
The defendant Clark moves to strike count three of the revised complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to allege statutory recklessness with the degree of specificity required by General Statutes § 14-295. That section provides in relevant part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury . . ."
In count three, the plaintiff alleges that Clark drove his vehicle recklessly in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, which prohibits reckless driving, that said violation was a "substantial factor" in causing her injuries and damage, and that this defendant should have known that his conduct involved a risk of substantial harm to others. The plaintiff also alleges in this count that Clark followed the vehicle in which she was a passenger too closely in violation of General Statutes § 14-240.
The degree of specificity needed to satisfy the pleading requirement of § 14-295 has not yet been addressed by the Connecticut appellate courts, and there is a split of authority among Superior Court judges. This court, however, has ruled on this issue in prior cases and agrees with the majority point of view which states that "a plaintiff in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in General Statutes § 14-295: that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries . . . The majority view is based both on an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself. CT Page 18564 These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matwiejczuk v. Schatten, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 02 514979 (January 29, 2003, Kocay, J.); accord Goodyear v. Ali, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0185809 (January 29, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.).
The reasoning behind the decision of Judge Shapiro in a case in early 2002 in Middletown has been persuasive in this connection. "[W]here the allegations of a count of a contested pleading support a cause of action of recklessness, the count sounding in recklessness may well be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in a count sounding in negligence . . . [T]here is no reason why the plaintiff, relying on the same set of facts in negligence counts, cannot set forth in separate counts, causes of action arising out of those same facts alleging recklessness . . . It is frequently urged on [the] Court that the similarity of allegations renders one cause of action (usually, of course, the recklessness one) invalid. But similarity cannot be the sole focus. To so consider would often require a plaintiff to ratchet down the negligence claim in order to render more visible the conceptual space between the counts. Focus must instead primarily rest on the recklessness-sufficiency of that count . . . Rather than follow a mechanistic approach . . . it seems more appropriate . . . to examine instead whether the facts that are alleged could, under any set of facts admissible under the pleadings, support a conclusion of recklessness." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drennan v. Geist, Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown, Docket No. CV 99 0089114 (January 29, 2002, Shapiro, J.).
The allegations in count three satisfy the pleading requirements of General Statutes § 14-295 by stating that the predicate or trigger statute, § 14-222, was deliberately and recklessly violated and such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. The motion to strike count three of the revised complaint is denied.
COUNT FOUR
The defendant Clark also moves to strike count four on the CT Page 18565 grounds that the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for common-law recklessness because the allegations in this count merely repeat the allegations in count one, which sound in negligence. The plaintiff contends that this count includes allegations, in addition to those made in count one, which sufficiently allege facts that support the claim of recklessness.
In count four of the revised complaint, the plaintiff incorporates paragraphs one through nineteen of the first count in negligence and further alleges that Clark operated his vehicle in reckless disregard of General Statutes § 14-240, prohibiting following too closely, that this violation was a substantial factor in the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, that Clark drove at an unreasonable rate of speed, and that this defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was reckless and unreasonable and would result in serious danger to others.
"To determine whether the plaintiff's [revised] complaint states a cause of action sounding in recklessness, [the court] look[s] first to the definitions of wilful, wanton and reckless behavior." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). "Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 832, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). Recklessness has also been described as "a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to make reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. Wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct designed to injure for which there is no just cause or excuse." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532-33, 542 A.2d 711 (1988).
"While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions CT Page 18566 between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 533.
As presently drafted, the plaintiff has not alleged facts in the fourth count that demonstrate an extreme departure from ordinary care. The allegations in count four do not allege reckless conduct as described above with sufficient specificity to survive a motion to strike. The defendant's motion to strike count four of the revised complaint is therefore granted. The demand for relief claiming punitive damages is therefore also stricken.
So Ordered.
William B. Lewis, Judge (T.R.)