MICHAEL J. REAGAN, District Judge
I. Background
At Doc. 92, Defendants PPG Industries, Inc., Vulcan Materials Company, The Dow Chemical Company, Imperial Chemicals Industries, PLC, and the three "Ashland" Defendants (collectively "Defendants"), jointly move pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 for summary judgment in their favor contending the pleadings, depositions, and discovery show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on (1) the failure of the expert causation opinions Plaintiff has submitted under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (see Docs 91, 99); and (2) Plaintiff's failure to produce any expert in support of certain key elements of her attempted strict liability cause of action.
ICI PLC was dismissed on its motion alleging lack of personal jurisdiction by order at Doc. 144. The logic in this Memorandum and Order applies equally to it, had it remained a Defendant.
II. The Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions, and affidavits leave no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of establishing both the absence of fact issues and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and makes all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Ulichny v. Merton Community School Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2001); Miranda v. Wisconsin Power Light Company, 91 F.3d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1996).
Because the primary purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims, the non-movant may not rest on the pleadings but must respond, with affidavits or otherwise, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Oest v. IDOC, 240 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2001); Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000).
III. Analysis
The facts of this case are discussed in detail in previous Orders and will not be repeated here, except to the extent necessary to understand the Court's ruling.
See Court Orders and Memoranda at Docs. 144 and 145.
Plaintiff Dianne Rains claims she developed multiple sclerosis due to her exposure to a dry cleaning solvent — perchloroethylene — between the years 1963 and 1979 at the "Helpee Selfee Laundromat and Dry Cleaners" owned by her parents and located in East St. Louis, Illinois. She alleges that the perchloroethylene was designed, manufactured, sold or distributed by the various Defendants, and that these Defendants are responsible for her injuries solely on a theory of strict products liability.
Defendants PPG Industries, Inc., Vulcan Materials Company, The Dow Chemical Company, and Imperial Chemicals Industries, PLC are alleged to be suppliers of perchloroethylene to the Ashland Defendants. Ashland is alleged to be a distributor of perchloroethylene to the laundromat where Plaintiff alleges her exposure occurred.
As part of her burden of proof, Plaintiff must prove her exposure to the perchloroethylene was a proximate cause of her injuries. An essential element of a plaintiff's cause of action for any tort is that there be a proximate causal relationship between the act or omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, page 263 (5th ed. 1984). In Smith v. Eli Lilly Co., 137 Ill.2d 222, 232, 148 Ill.Dec. 22, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court held that: "A fundamental principle of tort law is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the complained-of harm or injury; mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient proof." The Smith court rejected the notion that liability may be imposed based merely on a breach of duty, without causation being established. Smith, 137 Ill.2d at 266, 148 Ill.Dec. 22, 560 N.E.2d 324.
Without such proof of causation, Plaintiff's claim fails. The nature of this case is beyond the ken of the ordinary juror because it involves alleged toxic exposure to a chemical alleged to have caused an autoimmune disorder known as multiple sclerosis. At a minimum, the sciences involved include medicine toxicology and epidemiology. Consistent with Smith and black letter law regarding strict liability in tort, Plaintiff must offer expert testimony establishing that some act or omission on the part of Defendants was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury — multiple sclerosis. If that expert testimony is inadmissible under Daubert, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Such is the case here. The Court ruled at Doc.145 that the causation testimony of Plaintiff's retained expert — Dr. Poser, as well as that of her treating physician, Dr. Sultan — was inadmissible for failure to meet the Daubert standard of admissibility. As a result, there is no genuine issue as to a material fact — causation — and so the movants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Because Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of her claim, i.e. proximate cause, Defendants' joint motion for summary judgment based upon deficit of expert testimony (Doc. 92) is GRANTED.
This ruling renders several pending motions DENIED as moot: Docs. 79, 80, 82, 83, 98 and 133 through 142 inclusive.
IT IS SO ORDERED.