Summary of Opinion: The People of the State of New York v. Walter Rosado

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1996, defendant Walter Rosado was convicted of three counts of murder in the second degree and related crimes (including two counts of first‑degree burglary, two counts of first‑degree robbery and one count of hindering prosecution in the first degree) and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 20 years to life. The judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal (244 AD2d 772, leave to appeal denied 91 NY2d 977). In 2003, defendant filed a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 seeking to vacate the judgment on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, based principally on counsel's alleged failure to investigate and use defendant's psychiatric records or employ a psychiatrist to aid a duress defense. County Court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that the ineffective‑assistance claim could have been raised on direct appeal and, in any event, that defendant received effective assistance. Defendant obtained permission to appeal the denial, and the Appellate Division affirmed County Court's order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the ineffective‑assistance‑of‑counsel claim premised on trial counsel's failure to investigate and use psychiatric records (and to employ a psychiatrist) could properly be raised in a CPL 440.10 motion despite not having been raised on direct appeal.
Whether trial counsel's decision not to employ a psychiatrist or use the psychiatric records, and instead rely on defendant's testimony to assert a duress defense, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (i.e., whether the acts or omissions prejudiced the defense to the point that defendant did not receive meaningful representation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

Trial counsel reviewed defendant's psychiatric records but consciously chose not to employ a psychiatrist or use those records at trial.
Those psychiatric records, which were not admitted at trial, would have aided in establishing that defendant acted under duress when committing the crimes, and therefore counsel's failure to use them constituted ineffective assistance.

Respondent/County Court Position

County Court determined the ineffective‑assistance claim was not raised on direct appeal even though it could have been, implying procedural default of the claim.
County Court alternatively found that defendant in any event received effective assistance of counsel; trial counsel's strategy was reasonable and did not amount to ineffective assistance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Magee, 263 AD2d 763, 766	Permits raising an ineffective‑assistance claim in a CPL 440.10 motion when the issue was not decided on direct appeal because resolution depends on evidence not in the trial record.	Used to hold that Rosado's claim was properly raised in the CPL 440.10 motion because the psychiatric records were not part of the trial record and their contents had to be assessed.
People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714	Describes that to demonstrate ineffective assistance a defendant must show counsel's acts or omissions prejudiced the defense or the defendant's right to a fair trial.	Quoted to state the required showing of prejudice for an ineffective‑assistance claim.
People v. Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021, 1024	Defines prejudice as counsel's acts or omissions prejudicing the defense or right to a fair trial (quoted within Benevento).	Incorporated into the standard the court applied for assessing ineffective assistance.
People v. Berroa, 99 NY2d 134, 138	Holds that counsel's performance will not be considered ineffective if it reflects an objectively reasonable and legitimate trial strategy under the circumstances.	Relied upon to explain that an objectively reasonable strategy defeats an ineffective‑assistance claim unless the defendant shows no satisfactory strategic explanation existed.
People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147	States that whether a defendant received meaningful representation is viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation.	Used to frame the evaluative perspective for assessing counsel's overall representation.
People v. Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 565-566	Supports the principle that counsel's performance is judged by reasonableness and not by results.	Referenced as additional authority for the standard that unsuccessful tactics are not per se ineffective if reasonable.
People v. Garcia, 187 AD2d 868, 868-869, lv denied 81 NY2d 885	Applied the standard that counsel's performance must be objectively reasonable and that failure to investigate does not automatically equate to less than meaningful representation.	Cited to support the conclusion that Rosado failed to show counsel's omission amounted to ineffective assistance.
People v. Smith, 4 AD3d 163, 164	Example indicating portions of psychiatric records can undermine claims advanced by a defendant.	Referenced as an example showing that parts of the psychiatric records in this case could tend to undermine defendant's present claims.
People v. Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799	Illustrates that certain trial strategies may be pursued by a reasonably competent attorney.	Used to support the conclusion that trial counsel's strategy in this case might have been chosen by a reasonably competent attorney.
People v. Morehouse, 5 AD3d 925	Another authority recognizing that strategic choices can be reasonable even if a different approach might have been possible.	Cited alongside other cases to bolster the view that counsel's choice not to use psychiatric evidence could be a reasonable strategy.
People v. Butler, 273 AD2d 613, 615	Supports the proposition that counsel's strategy is entitled to deference when objectively reasonable.	Relied upon as part of the body of authority indicating counsel's strategy may be reasonable and thus not ineffective.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first reviewed the factual basis of the claim: trial counsel had reviewed defendant's psychiatric records with him and made a conscious strategic decision not to employ a psychiatrist or introduce those records at trial, instead choosing to rely on defendant's testimony to establish an affirmative defense of duress. Because the psychiatric records were not in evidence at trial, the court agreed with the defendant that the issue could not reliably have been decided on direct appeal and therefore was properly raised in a CPL 440.10 motion (citing People v. Magee).

The court then explained the legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: a defendant must show that counsel's acts or omissions prejudiced the defense or the right to a fair trial such that the defendant did not receive meaningful representation (citing People v. Benevento and People v. Hobot). Whether representation was meaningful is assessed in totality and as of the time of representation (People v. Baldi). Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective if it reflects an objectively reasonable and legitimate trial strategy under the circumstances (People v. Berroa and related authorities), and the defendant must show that no satisfactory strategic explanation exists.

Applying those principles, the court observed that trial counsel concluded defendant was not psychotic at trial and that portions of the psychiatric records — which the court considered — would tend to undermine defendant's present claims (citing People v. Smith as an example). Given those considerations, the court concluded that counsel's strategy of not employing a psychiatrist or using the psychiatric records "might well have been pursued by a reasonably competent attorney" (citing People v. Satterfield, People v. Morehouse and People v. Butler). Consequently, the court found that defendant had not demonstrated that counsel's failure to investigate and utilize the psychiatric records constituted less than meaningful representation (citing People v. Garcia) and affirmed the summary denial of the CPL 440.10 motion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The order of County Court denying defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment on ineffective‑assistance grounds is affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that defendant's motion was denied and his convictions and sentence remain intact. The court did not set aside the conviction or order a hearing, and the opinion applies established ineffective‑assistance standards to conclude that the particular strategic choice by trial counsel did not amount to less than meaningful representation. The opinion does not announce any new legal rule beyond application of existing precedents.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. WALTER ROSADO, Appellant.

In 1996, defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree (three counts) and other related crimes and was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 20 years to life. On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed ( 244 AD2d 772, lv denied 91 NY2d 977). In 2003, defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate his judgment of conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. County Court denied the motion, without a hearing, finding that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised on appeal even though it could have been and that, in any event, defendant did receive the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant appeals and we affirm.

The record establishes that defense counsel reviewed defendant's psychiatric records with him and made a conscious decision not to employ a psychiatrist or use the records, instead relying on defendant's own testimony to establish the affirmative defense of duress. Defendant now asserts that this decision resulted in him receiving ineffective assistance of counsel as those records — submitted in support of this motion — would have aided in establishing that he acted under duress while committing these crimes. As this issue cannot be decided without knowing the content of the psychiatric records — which were not put in evidence at trial — we disagree with County Court that defendant could have raised this issue on direct appeal and hold that it has been properly raised by the CPL 440.10 motion herein ( see People v. Magee, 263 AD2d 763, 766). Nonetheless, we conclude that County Court's summary denial of the motion should be affirmed.

To demonstrate the ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant is required to show that "counsel's acts or omissions `prejudice[d] the defense or defendant's right to a fair trial'" to the point where defendant did not receive meaningful representation ( People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714, quoting People v. Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021, 1024; see People v. Berroa, 99 NY2d 134, 138). Whether a defendant received meaningful representation is "viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation" ( People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 ), and "counsel's performance will not be considered ineffective, even if unsuccessful, as long as it reflects an objectively reasonable and legitimate trial strategy under the circumstances and evidence presented," and the defendant must show that such an explanation is lacking ( People v. Berroa, supra at 138; see People v. Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 565-566; People v. Garcia, 187 AD2d 868, 868-869, lv denied 81 NY2d 885).

Here, given trial counsel's conclusion that defendant was not psychotic at the time of trial and in light of those portions of the psychiatric records which would tend to undermine defendant's present claims ( see e.g. People v. Smith, 4 AD3d 163, 164), we conclude that trial counsel's strategy might well have been pursued by a reasonably competent attorney ( see People v. Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799; People v. Morehouse, 5 AD3d 925; People v. Butler, 273 AD2d 613, 615). Thus, we conclude that defendant has not shown that trial counsel's failure to investigate and utilize defendant's psychiatric records, to aid in establishing the duress defense, constituted less than meaningful representation ( see People v. Garcia, supra at 868-869).

Ordered that the order is affirmed.

PEOPLE v. ROSADO