Opinion by: ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice.
Edward Mesquiti challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of robbery. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In our factual sufficiency review, we provide a "neutral review" of all of the evidence, and a verdict is set aside "only if the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust." Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). "A clearly wrong and manifestly unjust verdict occurs where the jury's finding `shocks the conscience,' or `clearly demonstrates bias.'" Id. A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). Mesquiti contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Mesquiti concedes that sufficient evidence was presented to establish that the complainant was in fear but asserts that little or no evidence established that he made any threat to place the complainant in fear. The element of the crime of robbery, "places another in fear of imminent bodily injury," differs from an often compared but vastly dissimilar element "threatens another with imminent bodily injury." Williams v. State, 827 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). The general, passive requirement that another be "placed in fear" cannot be equated with the specific, active requirement that the actor "threaten another with imminent bodily injury." Id. Under the "placed in fear" language, the factfinder may conclude that an individual perceived fear or was "placed in fear," in circumstances where no actual threats were conveyed by the accused. Id. To commit robbery, the accused need not expressly threaten another or display a weapon. Pitte v. State, 102 S.W.3d 786, 792-793 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). The question presented is whether the victim found the defendant's actions to be threatening and whether the victim's fear of imminent bodily injury or death was reasonable under the circumstances. Welch v. State, 880 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no pet.). In this case, Mesquiti concedes that the complainant was placed in fear. The complainant testified that she was walking to her car when Mesquiti ran towards her and told her to give him her keys. She ignored him but then saw that Mesquiti had something in his hand. Mesquiti again told the complainant to give him her keys and started around the car to chase her. The complainant ran towards her manager's truck and jumped inside. She stated that she thought Mesquiti was going to hurt her and was afraid for her life. The complainant no longer leaves her work by herself because she is still afraid. The complainant's supervisor testified that he observed the complainant being chased by Mesquiti before she jumped into his truck. The supervisor stated that the complainant was traumatized by the events and was jumpy and crying. After Mesquiti was apprehended, he was transported to the police station and presented in a show-up for identification. When the complainant saw Mesquiti, she grabbed an officer's arm and tried to get behind him. The officer calmed her and told her Mesquiti could not hurt her. The officer stated that it took about fifteen to twenty minutes before the complainant was calm enough to provide a statement. The officer stated that the complainant was crying, terrified, and shaking. Because the State was not required to prove that Mesquiti threatened the complainant, Mesquiti's points of error are overruled. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show that the complainant was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury or death and that her fear was reasonable under the circumstances. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.