Opinion By Justice O'NEILL.
Samuel Solorzano appeals the revocation of his probation. Appellant waived a jury trial and entered a negotiated guilty plea to felony driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2) (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2004-05). Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years' confinement, probated for ten years, and assessed a $750 fine. The trial court modified the conditions of appellant's probation on two occasions. Subsequently, the State moved to revoke appellant's probation, alleging five violations. Appellant pleaded not true to all of the allegations. The trial court found all of the allegations true, revoked appellant's probation, and sentenced him to four years' confinement and a $656.50 fine. In five points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellate review of a probation revocation is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. In a revocation proceeding, the trial judge is the sole trier of the facts, credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the testimony. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. One of the allegations in the motion to revoke was that appellant failed to allow a home visit and failed to notify the probation department of the current home or employment address. At the revocation hearing, Raymond Coleman, a unit supervisor for the Tarrant County Adult Probation Department, testified the records showed that appellant's probation officer called the home telephone number that appellant had given them. A woman, who would not give her name, answered and stated appellant no longer lived there and she had no knowledge of his whereabouts. Appellant testified the "financial aspects" of probation were "overwhelming," and he could not afford to pay. Appellant testified he made only $9.86 an hour from employment, but he brought home only about $600 per month because his wages were being garnished for child support and back child support in the amount of $620 per month. Appellant cared for his disabled mother, and also had to keep a vehicle because he could not get to his job by public transportation. Appellant testified he stopped reporting because he could not pay the fees. Appellant testified he still lived with his mother, and he did not want to go to jail so he told his mother to tell whomever called for him that he did not live there anymore. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because he presented compelling evidence that his financial problems caused him not to report and there was no proof he did not notify the probation officer of a change in his home address. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because appellant admitted he failed to report, and that appellant's alleged inability to pay fees and restitution and his successful seven years on probation were not affirmative defenses to appellant's failure to report. We agree with the State. Appellant admitted he failed to report and that he instructed his mother to tell anyone who called that he no longer lived at that location. Appellant points to no case law nor have we found any that makes financial inability to pay an affirmative defense to allegations of failure to report or failure to notify of an address change. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to show appellant violated the terms of his probation by failing to report and failing to notify of an address change. Proof of one violation is sufficient to support revocation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 900. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's probation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. We overrule appellant's points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.