Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
"Generally, under New York statutory and case law, a court may address three threshold questions on a motion to compel or to stay arbitration: (1) whether the parties made a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) if so, whether the agreement has been complied with; and (3) whether the claim sought to be arbitrated would be time-barred if it were asserted in State court ( see, CPLR 7502 [b]; 7503; Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 9, n. 2)" ( Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham Co. v. Luckie, 85 NY2d 193, 201-202, cert denied sub nom. Manhard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, 516 US 811).
"Clearly, under New York law, statutory time limitation questions . . . as opposed to contractual time limitations agreed upon by the parties . . . are for the courts, not the arbitrators" ( Matter of Smith Barney Shearson v. Sacharow, 91 NY2d 39, 48 [emphasis added], quoting Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham Co. v. Luckie, supra at 202; see Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], supra at 8-9). Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the May 28, 2003, demand to arbitrate the July 10, 1996, termination of Mimose Zephirin's employment was time-barred by statute ( see CPLR 7502 [b]; Matter of County of Nassau v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., 265 AD2d 326).