Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The plaintiff, an air-conditioning technician, was injured when he hit his hip against an air-handling unit as he attempted to climb on top of it in order to replace worn-out bearings. The work performed by the plaintiff at the time of the accident involved the replacement of worn-out parts in a nonconstruction and nonrenovation context, and did not constitute "erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) so as to bring him within the protective ambit of the statute ( see Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1002; Jani v. City of New York, 284 AD2d 304; Rowlett v. Great S. Bay Assoc., 237 AD2d 183, 184).
The Supreme Court also properly dismissed the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action since the accident did not occur in connection with construction, demolition, or excavation work ( see Nagel v. D R Realty Corp., 99 NY2d 98, 103). Further, the Industrial Code sections relied upon either establish a general safety standard that does not give rise to a duty under Labor Law § 241 (6) ( see Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505) or are not applicable to the facts presented here.
Finally, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims. In opposition to the prima facie establishment of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff's affidavit contained feigned issues of fact which were designed to avoid the consequences of his earlier deposition testimony and were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Mestric v. Martinez Cleaning Co., 306 AD2d 449).