BECKER, J.
Appellant Maxine Anderson, age 73, went to the Bellevue Nordstrom store to buy a new pair of shoes. As she was leaving, she tripped where the tile floor transitions into a recessed mat in front of the door. She fell into a heavy glass partition and injured herself.
The heavy perforated mats, installed 10 years earlier, are constructed of recycled tire strips wired together. There is one large mat centered in front of the doorway, with two smaller mats located to each side. The mats are recessed into the tile floor and provide a level walking surface, but are not otherwise fastened in place.
Within weeks of her accident, Anderson had safety engineer Steven Miller inspect the location of her fall to determine if the mats presented a hazard. Miller visited the Nordstrom store on two occasions to examine the mats. He concluded that `the mat system as installed at Nordstrom's Bellevue store presented a hazard to Ms. Anderson and was the cause of her injuries.' Anderson filed suit against Nordstrom.
Clerk's Papers at 18.
In order to prove actionable negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and a resulting injury. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468, 474, 951 P.2d 749 (1998). Here, it is undisputed that Anderson is a business invitee to whom Nordstrom owed a duty of ordinary care, which includes an affirmative duty to discover and remedy dangerous conditions. Zenkina v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 83 Wn. App. 556, 561, 922 P.2d 271 (1996).
The first step in proving a breach of this duty is to produce evidence from which it can be inferred that an unsafe condition existed. Then, it is necessary to show either that the condition was caused by the defendant or its employees, or that the condition was within the actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant. Watters v. Aberdeen Recreation, Inc., 75 Wn. App. 710, 714, 879 P.2d 337 (1994). Constructive knowledge arises if the plaintiff can show that the condition existed long enough so that the proprietor should have discovered the condition in an exercise of ordinary care. Smith v. Manning's, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 573, 126 P.2d 44 (1942). Finally, for the defendant to be held liable for negligence, the claimed breach of duty must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Crowe v. Gaston, 134 Wn.2d 509, 514, 951 P.2d 1118 (1998).
After deposing Anderson and her expert Miller, Nordstrom moved for summary judgment on the basis that Anderson's evidence failed to demonstrate that her accident was caused by a dangerous condition that existed at the time of her fall, or that Nordstrom had actual or constructive knowledge of any allegedly dangerous condition. Nordstrom submitted declarations from three store employees documenting a regular program of inspecting the mats. A cleaning manager's nightly tour of the store included a visual inspection of the mats for cleanliness and potentially dangerous conditions. Once a month the maintenance manager physically inspected the entryway mats for missing or damaged areas and made repairs to ensure safe conditions. Nordstrom produced records showing that a physical inspection that occurred less than two weeks before Anderson's accident found no repairs to be necessary.
Clerk's Papers at 151-52.
Clerk's Papers at 154.
Anderson responded with a declaration from Miller, who opined that the perforated mats, as installed, presented a dangerous condition that Nordstrom should have discovered in an exercise reasonable care. He concluded that they presented three potential safety problems:
Clerk's Papers at 2.
1. The individual mats can shift and slide forward with foot traffic. This alone can cause someone to lose balance and fall.
2. When the mat shifts, it will necessarily roll-up in another position and this rise can trip the individual.
3. When more than one person is on the mat at the same time, the vertical loading from one can cause the mat to lift in a different location and present an obstacle to a second person.
He further opined,
The above defects and hazards could be corrected by securely fastening the mats in place and insuring that the floor beneath the mat is level and not warped or undulating. As far as Ms. Anderson's situation is concerned, we are not certain which mechanism caused her to stumble and fall forward onto the mat and into the glass partition. It is possible that the leading edge (at the transition between the floor tile and the mat) was out of position and raised up enough for her right shoe to catch against the mat indent.
The trial court granted Nordstrom's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed, in which we apply the usual de novo standard of review on summary judgment, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Youngblood v. Schireman, 53 Wn. App. 95, 99, 765 P.2d 1312 (1988). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact or the plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of each of the elements of her claim. Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain. Marshall v. Bally's PacWest, Inc., 94 Wn. App. 372, 377, 972 P.2d 475 (1999).
We will assume that Miller's engineering report, when viewed in the light most favorable to Anderson, is sufficient evidence to support an inference that the mats, as installed, presented a potential safety hazard; and we will further assume that the potential rolling-up of the mat was a hazard within Nordstrom's constructive knowledge. But even if Nordstrom was negligent in failing to secure the perforated mats, Anderson has not presented evidence sufficient to prove that the mat not being fastened to the floor was what caused her to trip.
Miller could not determine which of the three problems he identified with the mat caused Anderson to trip. He simply assumed that because Anderson tripped, the mat must have been the cause. The most his testimony offers is that if the mat had shifted so as to wrinkle up in front of Anderson, it might have been the cause.
Anderson testified, `I felt my shoe hit this grate'. But she also testified that she did not notice a bulge or gap in the mat immediately before her accident, even though she was looking where she was going and walking slowly. Her daughter who was walking in front of her did not notice a gap or bulge in the mat. And Anderson's deposition testimony shows that at the time she fell, she did not notice any wrinkling or bunching in the mat:
Clerk's Papers at 40.
Q: So what caused your fall?
A: It was the grate.
Q: And what was it about the grate that caused your fall?
A: Because it was not put down like it should be. It wrinkles up, you know.
Q: Well, did you see it wrinkle up that day?
A: No. That day I didn't see it, but I did see it afterwards.
Q: Well, when did you see it afterwards?
A: A couple of weeks.
Q: And what did you see then?
A: Well, what I saw was that the grate does move. It is not glued down all the way, and it does move. You can take your hand, and you can move that whole piece there. I didn't try them all. I just know that one.
Anderson stated that after she fell, she was assisted by an unnamed blond lady who might have worked for Nordstrom. According to Anderson, this lady told her, `It looks to me like you tripped on the carpeting or the mat.' This testimony does not establish causation. Anderson has not identified the blond lady; she has not shown that the blond lady's alleged statement is admissible under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule; and even if it is admissible, the statement does not establish that the mat had shifted, lifted, or rolled up in some fashion so as to cause Anderson to trip.
Deposition testimony of Anderson, Clerk's Papers at 41.
To establish liability, something more than the fact that the plaintiff tripped and fell is required. Brant v. Market Basket Stores, Inc., 72 Wn.2d 446, 448, 433 P.2d 863 (1967). The burden of proving proximate cause is not sustained unless the proof is sufficiently strong to remove that issue from the realm of speculation by establishing facts affording a logical basis for all inferences necessary to support it. Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn.2d 802, 809, 180 P.2d 564 (1947).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Anderson, the evidence she presents is entirely too speculative to establish causation. Accordingly, we conclude summary judgment was appropriate.
In view of our disposition, we need not address Nordstrom's argument that the trial court erred in denying Nordstrom's motion to strike some of the evidence upon which Anderson relies.
Affirmed.
COLEMAN and COX, JJ., concur.