BAKER v. VANNATTA

THERESA SPRINGMANN, Magistrate Judge

Pro se petitioner, James Baker, an inmate at the Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana, was charged with being a habitual conduct rule violator. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Baker filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Response filed on behalf of the respondent by the Attorney General of Indiana demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). In its response, the Attorney General of Indiana has submitted the administrative record, including documents designated A through H, which set out the underlying procedures in this conduct adjustment board (CAB) proceeding. Baker filed a traverse. Baker claims that the State violated his constitutional due process and equal protection rights.

On October 17, 2003, Officer Hall prepared a conduct report which charged Baker with being a habitual rule violator on the basis of five unrelated conduct reports incurred within a six month period. Baker was notified of the disciplinary hearing on the same day. The hearing was held on October 28, 2003. The CAB found Baker guilty of being a habitual rule violator. (Exhibit C.) This finding was based on the staff report, Baker's statement, and his prior history of behavior. The CAB then imposed a loss of 240 days earned credit time. The superintendent and the final reviewing authority upheld the sentence.

As the loss of good time credit is a "liberty" interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it triggers the applicability of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and requires certain procedural steps, as stated in that Supreme Court decision. Due process requires that Mr. Baker be given: (1) advance written notice of the charges against him at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact finder about the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Henderson v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67).

For the hearing to be meaningful, the prisoner should be afforded an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker, id., and the decision must be supported by "some evidence" in the record. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). This "some evidence" standard applies in this circuit, as reflected in Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999), and Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1996).

It is a lenient standard, requiring no more than "a modicum of evidence." Webb, 224 F.3d at 652. Even evidence that can be characterized as meager is sufficient to support the revocation of good-time credits so long as "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary." Id. (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). "The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56).

Baker raises two challenges to his CAB proceedings and sanctions. He alleges that his due process rights and equal protection rights were violated.

Baker says in his Petition that his equal protection rights were violated because his appeal was denied on the basis of the facts of the case, yet on those same facts another inmate's appeal was granted. On January 13, 2005, Baker filed a motion for discovery, requesting the complete administrative record of the comparable inmate, Daniel Portee.

Baker's equal protection claim fails because he does not allege, or provide evidence, that he was intentionally discriminated against because of his membership in a protected class. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1982) (gravamen of equal protection lies in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by the state's action). Baker does not identify the protected class to which he (or the only other identified inmate who was allegedly treated more favorably) belongs. In fact, he admits that his claim is not "based on any racial or religious issue." (Traverse at 2.) That another inmate's case was reversed on appeal and his was not does not state a constitutional violation. Baker has no right to the same outcome as another inmate in a CAB hearing and each case is heard by the CAB and reviewed on appeal on its own merits.

Baker claims that the CAB did not charge him with being a habitual offender within the ten days allowed under the Adult Disciplinary Procedures (ADP) and Indiana Code § 11-11-5-5(b). Relief under § 2254, however, is only available for violations of the federal constitution or federal laws. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). State law questions under the ADP do not state a claim for habeas relief. Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Ind. 1997); see also Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 1997) (a federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law).

To the extent Baker is challenging the process he is due under Wolff v. McDonnell, his petition is also without merit. Baker received all the due process rights owing to him when he received notice of the charges, had an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, received a written statement by the fact finder, had an impartial hearing board, and was found guilty by sufficient evidence of at least four unrelated conduct reports within six months.

For all the reasons stated, and because none of Baker's constitutional rights have been violated, this petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. Baker's motion for discovery [DE 16] is also DENIED.