Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.
The defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident ( see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). The defendants' medical expert noted in his affirmation that the plaintiff sustained a right ankle fracture and was in a cast for several weeks after the accident. Since Insurance Law § 5102 (d) specifically states that "serious injury means a personal injury which results in . . . a fracture," the defendants failed to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( Poma v. Ortiz, 2 AD3d 616; see Smolyar v. Krongauz, 2 AD3d 518). Under these circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff's opposition was sufficient to raise a question of fact ( see Coscia v. 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d 538; see also Chaplin v. Taylor, 273 AD2d 188; Mariaca-Olmos v. Mizrhy, 226 AD2d 437).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.