Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is granted and the order dated August 13, 2003, is vacated.
A party seeking to vacate a default is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action or defense ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]). It is within the discretion of the Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, to excuse a default resulting from law-office failure ( see CPLR 2005). Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant Ernest J. Peace established a reasonable excuse that he mistakenly diaried the place of the pretrial conference ( see CPLR 2005; Crystal Run Sand Gravel v. Milnor Constr. Corp., 301 AD2d 491). This was an isolated incident of non-appearance ( see Kingsland Group v. Satcin Realty Corp., 287 AD2d 440), and there was no evidence that the default was willful ( see Beizer v. Funk, 5 AD3d 619). Moreover, Peace arguably has a meritorious defense ( see Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 146, 152-54). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the motion.