JOHN COUGHENOUR, Chief Judge, District
This matter comes before the Court on Intervenor-Defendant East Lake Sammamish Community Association's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No. 73). ELSCA challenges the Court's January 5, 2005 Order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Specifically, ELSCA argues that the Court committed manifest error in declining to abstain, or, alternatively, that the Court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard to Plaintiffs' preemption challenge to the Sammamish Municipal Code § 21A.50.070. For the following reasons, ELSCA's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
ELSCA asserts that it was manifest error for the Court to limit its abstention analysis solely to the doctrine set forth in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Yet, even if the Court had considered the other myriad abstention doctrines, the result would have been the same. For example, had the Court considered Burford v. Sun Oil Company, 319 U.S. 315 (1943), it would have found abstention to be inappropriate in the case at bar. Burford abstention is appropriate where a case involves an unclear state law question of vital local concern, which must be addressed though a centralized unified state administrative system. Id. at 332. It does not take a thorough recitation of the facts to realize that Burford is inapposite. It is simply enough to observe that, rather than involving a question of state law, the parties' dispute involved a question of preemption under federal law, thus it fails the first part of the Burford test. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989) (finding that adjudication of plaintiff's federal preemption claim "would not disrupt the State's attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an `essentially local problem,' [citation omitted]."); U.S. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 827 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding Burford abstention not warranted where case involved a question of preemption under federal law, not a question of state law).
This argument is based on the Ninth Circuit's reference in Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004), to the Supreme Court's observation that "the various types of abstention are not rigid pigeon-holes into which Federal Courts must try to fit cases [. . .]." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1988) (internal citation omitted). ( See Mot. for Recons. at 3.)
Moreover, abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny would have likewise been inappropriate. Abstention under the principles of Younger is required upon demonstration of three factors: (1) there is an on-going state proceeding; (2) important state interests are implicated; and (3) the federal litigant is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in that proceeding. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). "Direct interference" with the state court proceeding is no longer required as a condition of Younger abstention. Id. Here the first factor is satisfied since there is no dispute that the state court action was on-going when Plaintiffs filed this federal action. However, despite ELSCA's attempt to characterize the underlying issue as one affecting a state's land use decisions (an important state interest), the Court must look to the "importance of the generic proceedings to the state" rather than inquiring "into the substantiality of the State's interest in the outcome of the particular case." NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365 (emphasis in original). Upon such inquiry it becomes clear that the true issue at stake concerns regulation of the railroads, which includes regulation of railbanked rights-of-way. Given the pervasive federal regulation in this field, this case clearly implicates important federal interests, rather than important state interests. Cf. NOPSI, 491 at 365 (reiterating that regulation of utilities is "one of the most important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States"). Because Younger abstention principles do not mandate abstention when the dispute does not implicate "important state interests" as refined by NOPSI, the Court did not err in declining to abstain from reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' federal preemption claim.
See, e.g., Chicago v. N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981).
Finally, even consideration of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), shows that abstention in this matter is not appropriate. Colorado River, and subsequent caselaw, emphasizes the discretionary nature of a federal court's decision to abstain from exercising validly conferred jurisdiction. See id. at 817. Factors relevant to a court's decision to abstain include: (1) whether the state court or the federal court has assumed jurisdiction over the res or property; (2) which forum is more convenient to the parties; (3) whether abstention would avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) which court obtained jurisdiction first; and (5) whether federal law or state law provides the basis for the decision on the merits. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-16, 23 (1983). However, the "mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications is not the kind of `interference' that merits federal court abstention." Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816) (internal quotations omitted). Important to the Supreme Court's holding in Colorado River were its findings of the extensive involvement of state water rights in the claims before the parallel state and federal proceedings, and the existence of federal legislation reflecting a congressional policy to avoid piecemeal litigation in adjudicating water rights. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819-20. Similar factors are notably absent from the case at bar. It would be inappropriate for the Court to rely on Colorado River as supporting abstention in this case.
Alternatively, ELSCA argues that the Court "overlooked the significant difference between a `facial' and an `as applied' challenge to legislation," (Mot. for Recons. at 5), thus the Court's Order was in manifest error. ELSCA correctly points out that the standard applied to a "facial" constitutional challenge is different from the standard used in an "as applied" constitutional challenge. (ELSCA's Mot. for Summ. J. at 14-16.) However, in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court found that the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), preempts the practical alternatives prong of the Sammamish Municipal Code § 21A.50.070 each and every time that requirement is used to prevent development of a trail on a railbanked right-of-way. In reaching this conclusion the Court appropriately focused on the standard applicable to a facial challenge. The fact that there may be only one railbanked right-of-way in the City of Sammamish does not convert Plaintiffs' facial challenge into an "as applied" challenge. The Court applied the correct legal standards in its preemption analysis.
In sum, the Court finds no error in its January 5, 2005 Order. For the aforementioned reasons, ELSCA's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.