EASLEY, Justice, for the Court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. The Estate of Kela Richardson was opened in the Second Judicial District Chancery Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, as a result of the January 29, 1996, wrongful death of Kela Richardson (Kela). Kela's mother, Bernice Richardson (Richardson), was appointed administratrix of the estate and granted letters of administration. Richardson filed a petition for determination of heirs-at-law and wrongful death beneficiaries. Richardson also filed a petition for authority to settle a claim of the estate and wrongful death beneficiaries.
¶ 2. The trial court entered an order granting authority to settle a claim of the estate and wrongful death beneficiaries. The trial court also entered an order determining heirs-at-law and declaring wrongful death beneficiaries to be: Bernice Richardson (mother); Virgil Cornes, Jr., (Cornes), (father); Virgil Cornes, III (brother); Julian Cornes (brother); Jerome Cornes (brother); Chrysanthemum Richardson (sister); Nathan Duwell White (brother) and Kamia White (sister).
¶ 3. Following recovery in the wrongful death case, Richardson filed a petition for determination of heirs-at-law and wrongful death beneficiaries and to disinherit natural father, Virgil Cornes, Jr., and his kindred, namely being Kela's brothers, Virgil Cornes, III, Julian Cornes and Jerome Cornes, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(I) (Rev. 2004). Richardson alleged that Cornes did not openly treat Kela as his child and did not provide any financial or emotional support to Kela. The trial court denied the petition to disinherit Cornes and Cornes' children because Richardson, as the administratrix, had previously filed sworn pleadings in which she alleged that the biological father and his children were heirs-at-law.
Richardson as the administratrix had sworn under oath in her petition for determination of heirs-at-law and wrongful death beneficiaries, filed August 11, 2000, that Kela was "survived by the following heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiary [sic], under Mississippi's Wrongful Death Act set forth in Mississippi Code Ann. Section 11-7-13 (cum.supp. 1992): Bernice Richardson, mother; Virgil Cornes, Jr., father; Chrysanthemum Richardson, sister; Nathan P. White, a minor brother; Kamie White, a minor sister; Virgil Cornes, III, minor brother; Julian Cornes, a minor brother and Jerome Cornes, a brother." (emphasis added).
¶ 4. Richardson appealed the trial court's decision. A divided Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and denied Cornes' motion for rehearing on August 3, 2004. In re Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1099993 (Miss.Ct.App. 2004).
Judge Irving authored the majority decision for the Court of Appeals, in which Chief Judge King, and Judges Thomas, Lee and Chandler concurred. Judge Griffis concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Presiding Judges Bridges, and Southwick and Judge Myers.
¶ 5. Unhappy with the decision of the Court of Appeals, Cornes filed a petition to this Court for writ of certiorari. This Court granted Cornes' writ of certiorari.
FACTS
¶ 6. Bernice Richardson and Virgil Cornes, Jr., were the natural parents of Kela Richardson. Richardson and Cornes were never married. Kela died intestate in January 29, 1996, at the age of twenty-two years old. Richardson was granted letters of administration and proceeded with a wrongful death case on behalf of Kela's wrongful death beneficiaries. That suit yielded a substantial settlement.
¶ 7. Meanwhile, Richardson filed numerous sworn pleadings declaring Kela's heirs-at-law and wrongful death beneficiaries to be Richardson, her other children, Cornes, and Cornes' other children. In his separate opinion Court of Appeals Judge Griffis noted, "[n]owhere did Richardson or [Ellis] Turnage advise the chancellor that any of the named individuals were `potential' heirs or indicate that there was any remaining controversy on or challenge to the Cornes' right of heirship or their right to receive a portion of the wrongful death settlement proceeds." Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d at ___, 2004 WL 1099993 at *14.
¶ 8. In both the estate action and the wrongful death action, Richardson was represented by attorney Ellis Turnage. Turnage assisted Cornes and his children in filing their waivers of process and joinders to the petition for authority to settle a claim of the estate and wrongful death beneficiaries filed by Richardson to receive authority to settle Kela's wrongful death claim. Turnage also represented Cornes in creating a guardianship for his minor child for purposes of handling the settlement proceeds.
Judge Griffis stated:
Ellis Turnage apparently wore several hats. He represented Richardson in the administration of Kela's estate. He represented the wrongful death beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. He also represented Virgil Cornes, Jr. and Virgil Cornes, III, in establishing a guardianship for Virgil Cornes, III. According to the Corneses' brief, Turnage remains as the attorney of record for the guardianship of Virgil Cornes, III, a minor whose interest he is directly opposed in the petition to disinherit. While Turnage's apparent conflicting loyalties will be a topic for a different forum, it clearly evidences that the Corneses relied on Turnage to believe that no further proceedings were required to establish their rights as Kela's legal heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries.
Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d at ___, 2004 WL 1099993, n. 4.
¶ 9. On November 29, 2000, the trial court entered an order that determined Kela's heirs-at-law and declared her eight wrongful death beneficiaries to be Richardson, Richardson's other children, Cornes and his children. On November 29, 2000, the trial court also entered a separate order which granted Richardson the authority to settle the claims of the estate and the wrongful death beneficiaries. That order directed Richardson to distribute the proceeds of the settlement equally between Richardson, her children, Cornes, and his children. The order stated:
That after acceptance of the settlement, Petitioner is authorized to distribute the remainder of the settlement funds equally among the wrongful death beneficiaries of Kela Richardson, deceased, with a 1/8 (one-eighth) share being distributed to each of the 8 (eight) wrongful death beneficiaries.
¶ 10. On January 4, 2001, the trial court entered an order granting authority to Richardson, as administratrix, to open an interest-bearing account and empowered her to deposit the $339, 077.80, in settlement proceeds into the account.
¶ 11. Despite the trial court's orders, Richardson did not distribute the settlement proceeds. On June 6, 2001, Richardson filed a second petition to determine the heirs-at-law and wrongful death beneficiaries. Richardson requested that the trial court disinherit Cornes and his kindred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3)(d). On September 5, 2001, Cornes and Virgil Cornes, III, filed a petition to enforce the trial court's prior orders. Julian Cornes and Jerome Cornes subsequently joined into the petition to enforce the trial court's prior orders. Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing.
Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(I) states:
(d) The natural father of an illegitimate and his kindred shall not inherit:
(I) From or through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused or neglected to support the child.
¶ 12. On March 1, 2002, the trial court ruled that Richardson was prohibited, based on the clean hands doctrine and estoppel, from maintaining her petition to disinherit. The order of the trial court stated in pertinent part:
That the Administratrix is prohibited, based on the clean hands doctrine and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from maintaining her Petition to Disinherit because the Administratrix has made numerous sworn statements that the Cornes are heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of the Decedent to this Court and the Court has found them in fact to be heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of the Decedent, and the Administratrix cannot now make another sworn statement contrary to her prior sworn statements and receive a benefit to the detriment of the Cornes.
¶ 13. Richardson appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded for a hearing on the merits of the petition to disinherit Cornes.
Cornes' cross-appeal regarding the award of fees to the Administratrix and to her attorney are not at issue in the appeal to this Court.
DISCUSSION
¶ 14. The Court of Appeals held that Richardson's pleadings did not operate as a waiver of Cornes' obligation, under the statute governing inheritance from an illegitimate child, to prove that he acknowledged and supported Kela during her lifetime. Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d at ___, 2004 WL 1099993 at *5. The Court of Appeals also held that Richardson was not barred under the doctrine of unclean hands from seeking to disinherit Cornes and his children. Id., ___ So.2d at ___, at *7. The Court of Appeals found that Cornes and his children did not suffer any detriment as a result of Richardson's petitioning to disinherit them, after admitting in her prior pleadings that they were heirs-at-law of Kela. Id., ___ So.2d at ___, at **7-8. The Court of Appeals also found that Richardson was not barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel from petitioning to disinherit Cornes and his children. Id., ___ So.2d at ___, at *8.
¶ 15. We disagree. The doctrine of unclean hands applies to the case at hand as determined by the trial court. The doctrine of unclean hands provides that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands." Thigpen v. Kennedy, 238 So.2d 744, 746 (Miss. 1970). In O'Neill v. O'Neill, 551 So.2d 228, 233 (Miss. 1989), this Court further expounded upon the meaning of unclean hands, stating: "[t]he meaning of this maxim is to declare that no person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court of equity when his conduct with respect to the transaction in question has been characterized by wilful inequity. . . ." The Court in Brennan v. Brennan, 605 So.2d 749, 752 (Miss. 1992), held that "[t]he maxim should be applied by the court sua sponte where it is shown to be applicable." See also Estate of Van Ryan v. McMurtray, 505 So.2d 1015, 1019 (Miss. 1987) ("[t]his Court has held that when it is evident by the facts of the case that the unclean hands doctrine is applicable, the chancellor has a duty to apply that doctrine of its own motion."). As stated by Court of Appeals Judge Griffis:
Because of Richardson's and Turnage's actions and representations in obtaining the waivers and joinders, in submitting the Heirship Petition and the Settlement Petition and in obtaining the chancellor's approval of the orders determining Kela's heirs and authorizing the settlement of the wrongful death action, Richardson came before the court with unclean hands when she presented the petition to disinherit and should not be allowed to benefit from such wilful misconduct or such improper, unconscientious, or unjust conduct.
Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d at ___,
2004 WL 1099993 at *18.
¶ 16. Likewise, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to bar Richardson from seeking to disinherit Cornes and his kindred. "The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon fundamental notions of justice and fair dealing." O'Neill, 551 So.2d at 232. The Court has identified two elements that must be satisfied: "(1) that he [a party] has changed his position in reliance upon the conduct of another; and (2) that he has suffered detriment caused by his change of position in reliance upon such conduct." Id. at 232 (citing PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201, 206 (Miss. 1984)). In PMZ Oil, 449 So.2d at 206, this Court stated "[w]henever in equity and good conscience persons ought to behave ethically toward one another the seeds for a successful employment of equitable estoppel have been sown." Judge Griffis stated:
From the previous discussion of the facts of this case, the chancellor was within his discretion to find that the Corneses relied upon the actions and representations of Richardson and Turnage that they would be adjudicated as Kela's wrongful death beneficiaries.
The Corneses relied on their representations of Richardson and Turnage in joining the Heirship Petition and Settlement Petition. They suffered detriment because of the change in position by Richardson and Turnage.
Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d at ___,
2004 WL 1099993 at *19.
¶ 17. We find that the doctrine of judicial estoppel also applies. Id., ___ So.2d at ___, at *16. "Judicial estoppel precludes a party from asserting a position, benefitting from that position, and then, when it becomes more convenient or profitable, retreating from that position later in the litigation." Dockins v. Allred, 849 So.2d 151, 155 (Miss. 2003). "Because of judicial estoppel, a party cannot assume a position at one stage of a proceeding and then take a contrary stand later in the same litigation." Id. As Judge Griffis clearly stated:
Richardson and Turnage filed the pleadings that resulted in the case being decided based on the equitable doctrines of judicial estoppel, unclean hands and equitable estoppel, rather than on the statutory structure of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 91-1-15(3). Had Richardson and Turnage taken a different procedural route, i.e., shown candor and honesty with the chancellor, a different result may have been obtained. Instead, they chose not to do so.
Estate of Richardson, ___ So.2d at ___,
2004 WL 1099993 at *16.
¶ 18. The chancellor sits as the finder of fact, and "[t]he chancellor's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless there is manifest error." Tice v. Shamrock GMS Corp., 735 So.2d 443, 444 (Miss. 1999) (citing Murphy v. Murphy, 631 So.2d 812, 815 (Miss. 1994); Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss. 1990)). We find that the trial court did not err by ruling that Richardson was now prohibited from pursuing her petition to disinherit Cornes and Cornes' children should be affirmed. Accordingly, we reverse Court of Appeals' judgment and affirm the judgment of the trial court to deny Richardson's petition to disinherit Cornes and Cornes's children.
CONCLUSION
¶ 19. We find that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court as to the determination of heirs-at-law. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and rendered in part as to the determination of heir-at-law as discussed in the opinion above. The judgment of the Second Judicial District Chancery Court of Bolivar County is affirmed in part as to the determination of heirs-at-law.
¶ 20. The issue of the administratrix's fees and attorney's fees raised in Cornes's cross-appeal at the Court of Appeals was not presented to this Court on petition for certiorari. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part as to the award of administratrix's fees and attorney's fees. The judgment of the Second Judicial District Chancery Court of Bolivar County is reversed in part and remanded in part as to the issue of administratrix's fees and attorney's fees in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
¶ 21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED IN PART AS TO THE DETERMINATION OF HEIRS-AT-LAW. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF BOLIVAR COUNTY IS AFFIRMED IN PART AS TO THE DETERMINATION OF HEIRS-AT-LAW. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART AS TO THE AWARD OF ADMINISTRATRIX'S FEES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF BOLIVAR COUNTY IS REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART AS TO THE AWARD OF ADMINISTRATRIX'S FEES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. COBB, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.