GORDON QUIST, District Judge
The Court has before it Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed on December 30, 2004. Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants' motion within the time prescribed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c). The Sixth Circuit has held that in a case such as this,
a district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not responded. The court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant's motion for summary judgment to ensure that he has discharged that burden.
Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991).
See also Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that where the nonmoving party has not responded, a court's reliance on facts advanced by the movant is proper and sufficient).
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this case on November 14, 2003, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants committed several violations of his constitutional rights in connection with Plaintiff's arrest on February 5, 2000. Arguably, Plaintiff's complaint can also be construed to allege a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 based upon his allegations that there was no probable cause for his arrest, that Defendant Rozema testified falsely at the preliminary examination, and that Plaintiff was never convicted on the charges.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court agrees.
The personal injury statute of limitations in the relevant state establishes the statutory period for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1946-47 (1985). The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Michigan is three years. M.C.L. § 600.5805(8);Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Krum v. Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994, 998 (W.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 407 F.2d 490, 491 (6th Cir. 1967). Under Sixth Circuit law, the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff's claims based upon his arrest, including his claims arising under the Fourth Amendment and his claims based upon due process and equal protection (racial profiling), accrued on the date of the arrest because Plaintiff would have known of the acts giving rise to his injury as of that date. See McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir. 1988). The statute of limitations for these claims expired on February 5, 2003, nine months before Plaintiff filed his complaint.
Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim accrued when the criminal case terminated in favor of Plaintiff, or when all of the charges were dropped. See id. at 907. At the latest, this claim would have accrued on September 18, 2000, when the Kent County Circuit Court entered a Nolle Prosequi Order. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint more than three years after that date, his claim is untimely. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion and dismiss the case with prejudice.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.