Defendant is not an insurer, and the contract of indemnity pursuant to which it is bound, strictly construed ( see Hooper Assoc., Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 NY2d 487, 491-492; Matter of Heimbach v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 75 NY2d 387, 392), does not impose upon it a defense obligation comparable in breadth to that ordinarily borne by an insurer; its duty to defend is no broader than its duty to indemnify ( see Brasch v. Yonkers Constr. Co., 306 AD2d 508). Whether the claims for which indemnification is here sought fall within the parties' agreement is a matter of interpretation that will not necessarily be determined when the underlying personal injury claims are resolved, so dismissal at this juncture on the ground that the indemnification claims are premature is not warranted. Although the underlying complaints allege intentional misconduct, it is unclear whether plaintiff and its predecessor in interest will be found to have intended the consequences of such conduct, so that dismissal of the indemnification claims with respect to such conduct is also not warranted ( see Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 NY2d 392, 400-401; Hertz Corp. v. Government Empls. Ins. Co., 250 AD2d 181, 185-186, lv dismissed 93 NY2d 1040).
We have considered the parties' other contentions for affirmative relief and find them unavailing.