EISENHAUER, J.
Plaintiffs James F. Kress and W.C. Stewart Construction, Inc., appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and intervenors. They contend the court erred in concluding Kress Road is a private road. We review their claim for corrections of errors at law. Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1995).
Thomas and Nancy Fischer own property in Dubuque County. Kress Road is a dead-end road approximately 6/10 of a mile long. It runs over approximately sixty-eight feet of the Fischers' property, and provides access to two single-family farms from Lovers Lane. One of these farms is owned by James and Janet Kress.
The Kresses elected to sell their property to W.C. Stewart Construction, Inc. They sought to rezone the property from A-1 agricultural to R-1 residential. Although the county initially agreed to rezone the property and allow Kress Road to be expanded at the plaintiffs' expense, the county engineer, after examining county records, determined the road was not owned by the county.
On July 12, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari and motion for declaratory judgment against Dubuque County and its Board of Supervisors. The plaintiffs sought to have Kress Road declared a county road and to reverse the denial of rezoning. On July 23, 2003, the Fischers filed a petition to intervene.
On March 19, 2004, the Fischers filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the cause of action. On March 30, 2004, plaintiffs resisted the motion and filed their own motion for summary judgment. On April 8, 2004, Dubuque County filed its response to each motion, resisting the plaintiffs' motion and supporting the Fischers' motion for summary judgment.
The matter was submitted on the motions for summary judgment on April 12, 2004. No material issues of fact were disputed and each movant asked the court to decide, as a matter of law, whether Kress Road was in fact a county road. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the Fischers' motion. The court found insufficient evidence exists to conclude Kress Road became a public roadway by direct acquisition, formal dedication and acceptance, implied dedication, or prescriptive easement. The plaintiffs contend the court was in error.
Summary judgment is appropriately entered if the record shows "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). We examine the record before the district court to decide whether a genuine issue of material facts exists and whether the court correctly applied the law. Benavides, 539 N.W.2d at 354. We view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1996).
Plaintiffs first contend the court erred in failing to conclude as a matter of law that Kress Road was established as a county road by prescriptive easement. Under Iowa law, an easement by prescription is created when a person uses another's land under a claim of right or color of title, openly, notoriously, continuously, and hostilely for ten years or more. Johnson v. Kaster, 637 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Iowa 2001). We must determine on a case-by-case basis whether there is evidence to support the requirements of a prescriptive easement. Id. at 179. Permissive use of land does not establish easement by prescription absent any showing that the party claiming prescriptive easement claimed it as a matter of right or under any color of title. Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 1987). Here, the county makes no claim to the road. Rather, it denies Kress Road is a county road. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's decision.
The plaintiffs next contend summary judgment is not warranted because the court's belief that "a tacit agreement was entered between a machine operator and a previous owner . . . that the county would maintain the road in exchange for a possible turn-around area or as being the neighborly thing to do" is not supported by evidence.
We conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorably to the plaintiffs, fails to establish that Kress Road is a county road. Whether the county performed maintenance of the Kress Road due to an agreement, a mistake, or as a neighborly favor is irrelevant. The elements of prescriptive easement have not been shown. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of the Fischers' motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.