ESTATE OF KORDON

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 22672-7-III.

Attorney(S)

Michael E. de Grasse, for appellant. John W. Lohrmann, for respondent.

Judges

SWEENEY, A.C.J.

Acts

— PROBATE AND TRUST LAWWILL CONTESTS — Filing of will contest petition-Notice
— PROBATE AND TRUST LAWWILL CONTESTS — Contest of probate or rejection-Limitation of action-Issues
— PROBATE AND TRUST LAWTRUST AND ESTATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION — General power of courts-Intent-Plenary power of the court
— PROBATE AND TRUST LAWTRUST AND ESTATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION — Definitions

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The trial court admitted Robert Kordon's will to probate on April 25, 2001, naming Leilani Duke as the beneficiary and personal representative. Helen Cleveland, Kordon's sister, petitioned on August 24, 2001 to set the will aside in the probate proceeding. Cleveland mailed a copy of her petition to Duke's attorney but did not cause a citation to be issued as required by RCW 11.24.020. Informal discovery and settlement discussions occurred through August 2003. Duke moved on September 15, 2003 to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing Cleveland's failure to cause issuance of a citation deprived the court of jurisdiction. A citation was not issued until October 9, 2003. The trial court dismissed Cleveland's petition, concluding issuance of a citation was a prerequisite to jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (chapter 11.96A RCW) applies to a will contest commenced in an existing probate proceeding so as to eliminate the RCW 11.24.020 requirement that a citation be issued to obtain personal jurisdiction.
Whether a citation issued more than two years after the filing of a will-contest petition satisfies the statute's requirements or is untimely (i.e., whether issuance after such a delay is within a "reasonable time").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Helen Cleveland)

The will contest was timely filed in the existing probate proceeding; because the necessary parties were already before the court, the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (chapter 11.96A RCW) applies and removes the need to issue a citation under RCW 11.24.020.
Alternatively, even if a citation is required, one was issued in this case and the statute contains no specific time limit for issuance.

Respondent (Leilani Duke)

Ms. Cleveland failed to cause the citation required by RCW 11.24.020 to be issued, depriving the court of personal jurisdiction over the adverse party and warranting dismissal of the will contest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
In re Estate of Peterson, 102 Wn. App. 456, 462, 9 P.3d 845 (2000)	Support for the proposition that a question of law is reviewed de novo.	The court invoked de novo review for the legal question whether chapter 11.96A RCW alters the citation requirement of RCW 11.24.020.
In re Estate of Palucci, 61 Wn.App. 412, 415, 810 P.2d 970 (1991)	That a will contest is a purely statutory proceeding and that personal jurisdiction in a will contest is acquired by issuance of a citation.	The court relied on this principle to conclude jurisdiction in a will contest depends on compliance with the statutory citation requirement.
In re Estate of Van Dyke, 54 Wn. App. 225, 228, 772 P.2d 1049 (1989)	Quoted for the statutory nature and limits of will-contest jurisdiction; cited for the proposition that a citation must be issued within a reasonable time.	The court used Van Dyke to support the requirement that an issued citation be timely (within a reasonable time) and that failure to timely issue a citation affects jurisdiction.
In re Estate of Toth, 138 Wn.2d 650, 656, 981 P.2d 439 (1999)	That a challenge to a will must be filed within the statutory period (here, within four months of admitting the will to probate under RCW 11.24.010).	The court referenced Toth to confirm the statutory deadlines for filing a will contest.
Postema v. Postema Enters., Inc., 118 Wn. App. 185, 195, 72 P.3d 1122 (2003)	That courts give effect to legislative intent and, when statutory language is clear, look no further than the language itself.	The court applied the plain-meaning rule to RCW 11.24.020, concluding the statute's mandatory language requires issuance of a citation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court treated the question as one of law and reviewed it de novo. It began with RCW 11.24.020's mandatory language that "a citation shall be issued" upon filing a will-contest petition to obtain personal jurisdiction over executors and legatees. Applying the plain-meaning rule, the court concluded the statute clearly mandates issuance of a citation. The court then considered whether the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (chapter 11.96A RCW) supplants that requirement. Chapter 11.96A RCW grants broad authority over "matters" concerning estates, but the Act's defined term "matter" does not include will contests (RCW 11.96A.030(1)). Because will contests are not within the Act's defined scope, chapter 11.96A does not override the specific mandatory provisions of RCW 11.24.020. Finally, the court addressed timeliness: while RCW 11.24.020 contains no explicit issuance deadline, precedent requires that a citation be issued within a reasonable time. Issuance more than two years after the petition was filed was held to be untimely. On that basis, the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

Holding: The Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (chapter 11.96A RCW) does not eliminate the RCW 11.24.020 requirement that a citation be issued to obtain personal jurisdiction in a will contest, and a citation issued more than two years after commencement of the will contest is untimely; the trial court's dismissal of the will contest was therefore affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that Cleveland's will challenge remained dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to timely cause issuance of a citation. The opinion applies existing statutory interpretation and timeliness principles to the will-contest context; it does not announce a broader change in statutory requirements beyond the application to these facts.

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In the Matter of the Estate of ROBERT KORDON. HELEN D. CLEVELAND, Appellant, v. LEILANI R. DUKE, Indi

SWEENEY, A.C.J.

¶1 This is a will contest. The challenger petitioned to set aside the will but did not cause a "citation" to be issued to the personal representative until almost two years after she petitioned. RCW 11.24.020 requires the issuance of a citation. The question presented is whether Washington's Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (chapter 11.96A RCW) applies here and changes the requirement of RCW 11.24.020 to issue a citation. It does not. A citation was required. And we therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of the challenge to this will.

FACTS

¶2 The court entered an order admitting Robert Kordon's will to probate on April 25, 2001. The will essentially left Mr. Kordon's property to Leilani Duke. Mr. Kordon named Ms. Duke as his personal representative. And the court honored that request. Helen Cleveland is Mr. Kordon's sister. She petitioned to set the will aside on August 24, 2001, in the probate proceeding.

¶3 Ms. Cleveland mailed a copy of her petition to Ms. Duke's attorney. Ms. Cleveland did not, however, issue or cause to be issued a citation to either Ms. Duke or her attorney. There were, nonetheless, some informal discovery requests and settlement discussions until August 2003.

¶4 Ms. Duke moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction or alternatively for summary judgment on September 15, 2003 (over two years after Ms. Cleveland's petition was filed). Ms. Duke argued that Ms. Cleveland failed to issue the citation required by RCW 11.24.020 and this deprived the court of jurisdiction.

¶5 A citation was finally issued on October 9, 2003.

¶6 The court dismissed Ms. Cleveland's petition, concluding the citation was a prerequisite to jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Ms. Cleveland argues essentially that she timely filed her petition to contest the will and, notwithstanding the provision in RCW 11.24.020 (requiring the issuance of a citation), the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act applies and dispenses with the need to issue a citation because she filed the action as part of the existing probate proceeding. No citation should therefore be required since the necessary parties were already a part of the proceeding; Ms. Duke is the only adverse party.

¶8 This is a question of law. So our review is de novo. In re Estate of Peterson, 102 Wn. App. 456, 462, 9 P.3d 845 (2000).

¶9 "`A will contest is a purely statutory proceeding, and the court must be governed by the provisions of the applicable statute. The jurisdiction of the trial court is derived exclusively from the statute, and may be exercised only in the mode and under the limitations therein prescribed.'" In re Estate of Palucci, 61 Wn.App. 412, 415, 810 P.2d 970 (1991) (quoting In re Estate of Van Dyke, 54 Wn. App. 225, 228, 772 P.2d 1049 (1989)). A challenge to the will must be filed within the statutory period — here within four months of admitting the will to probate. RCW 11.24.010; In re Estate of Toth, 138 Wn.2d 650, 656, 981 P.2d 439 (1999).

¶10 The court acquires personal jurisdiction over an adverse party to a will contest by the issuance of a citation. Palucci, 61 Wn. App. at 415. RCW 11.24.020 requires that:

Upon the filing of the petition referred to in RCW 11.24.010, a citation shall be issued to the executors who have taken upon themselves the execution of the will, . . . and to all legatees named in the will residing in the state, . . . requiring them to appear before the court, on a day therein specified, to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

(Emphasis added.)

¶11 We give effect to the legislative intent. And in doing so we need look no further than the statutory language when the language is clear, as it is here. Postema v. Postema Enters., Inc., 118 Wn. App. 185, 195, 72 P.3d 1122 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1011 (2004).

¶12 Ms. Cleveland argues, nonetheless, that the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act codified by the legislature in 1999 overrides or at least supplements the will contest statute in a way that eliminates the need for a citation when the will contest is part of an ongoing probate proceeding. Chapter 11.96A RCW. The general power of the court under chapter 11.96A RCW is spelled out in RCW 11.96A.020:

(1) It is the intent of the legislature that the courts shall have full and ample power and authority under this title to administer and settle:

(a) All matters concerning the estates and assets of incapacitated, missing, and deceased persons, including matters involving nonprobate assets and powers of attorney, in accordance with this title; and

. . . .

(2) If this title should in any case or under any circumstance be inapplicable, insufficient, or doubtful with reference to the administration and settlement of the matters listed in subsection (1) of this section, the court nevertheless has full power and authority to proceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered and settled by the court.

(Emphasis added.) The question, then, is whether a will contest is such a "matter." But "matter" is defined in this statutory scheme. And it does not include will contests. RCW 11.96A.030(1). Chapter 11.96A RCW does not then change the specific mandatory provisions of RCW 11.24.020, which require a citation. The language in RCW 11.24.020 remains effective. And a citation is required for a will contest.

¶13 Ms. Cleveland argues nonetheless that, even conceding the necessity for issuance of a citation, one was issued here. And there is no statutory time limit for the issuance of a citation. While that is true, the citation must be issued within a reasonable time. See Van Dyke, 54 Wn. App. at 229; Palucci, 61 Wn. App. at 413-14, 417; RCW 11.24.020.

¶14 Here, there was no issuance of a citation until over two years following the petition for the will contest. We hold that the issuance of a citation two years after commencement of a will contest comes too late.

¶15 The trial court's judgment dismissing this will contest is affirmed.

SCHULTHEIS and BROWN, JJ., concur.

Reconsideration denied May 10, 2005.

Review granted at 156 Wn.2d 1005 (2006).