ELDON FALLON, District Judge
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion of Cedyco Corporation for New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, the Motion is hereby DENIED.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed its declaratory action on May 13, 2004, in state court to determine the rights and obligations of the parties as regards ownership of an oil well in the Deer Island Field located in Terrebonne Parish, known as the CLF No. 2 well, and proceeds from sales from that well. Plaintiff is the operator of the CLF No. 2 well. There is a dispute over who owns a certain 26.7948 percent (hereinafter "26%") interest in the well sold by Defendant Petroquest. Defendant Suard Barge claims that it owns the 26% interest pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement entered into with Petroquest in April of 2003. Defendant Cedyco claims that it purchased Petroquest's 26% from Petroquest at an auction held in Houston, Texas.
Prior to the instant suit being filed, Cedyco filed two lawsuits in Texas regarding the dispute, both of which are still pending. All three suits involve the same well in the Deer Island Field and ownership and rights therein. In the federal lawsuit filed on March 3, 2003, Cedyco filed suit against Petroquest alleging that Petroquest sold its interest in the Deer Island Field and the well to Cedyco at an auction held in Houston, Texas prior to the Purchase and Sale agreement between Petroquest and Suard Barge. In the state lawsuit, Cedyco filed suit against Baby Oil, Suard Barge, Gulfmark, and SemCrude seeking recognition of and payment for its original 11% interest. In its opposition to the motion to remand, Cedyco states that Judge Hughes in the Southern District of Texas held that Cedyco owns the disputed 26% interest. Moreover, Cedyco states that the state court granted summary judgment in favor of Cedyco, recognizing Cedyco's ownership of the 11% interest, and has ordered that Cedyco receive the funds attributable thereto.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Gulfmark Energy and SemCrude have purchased crude oil from it. Allegedly, these two Defendants have refused to pay disputed proceeds to the Plaintiff and have, instead, deposited the disputed funds into the registry of the Harris County Texas Court. Moreover, according to the Plaintiff, both Cedyco and Suard Barge have made competing claims for payment of the disputed funds from Baby Oil, as operator of the well.
Thus, in its declaratory judgment, Plaintiff averred that there is a dispute as to whether and in what percentage Cedyco has an interest in the proceeds from the well. Moreover, Plaintiff claims there is a dispute between the parties as to whether Petroquest sold its interest in the well to Cedyco or Suard Barge.
Cedyco removed the matter on January 5, 2005, to this Court, alleging that the non-diverse Defendants Petroquest and Suard Barge were fraudulently joined for the sole purpose of defeating diversity. Moreover, Cedyco claimed that the issues presented in the instant matter are now before Judge Hughes in Cedyco Corporation v. Petroquest Energy (H-03-1668) in the Southern District of Texas. According to Cedyco, Judge Hughes held that Cedyco owns the disputed 26% interest. Thus, Cedyco claims that the instant suit was filed to avoid the jurisdiction and rulings of the Southern District of Texas.
Defendants Suard Barge and Petroquest respectively filed objections to the notice of removal because Cedyco did not seek their consent to the removal. Suard Barge argued, among other things, that it is the owner of the disputed 26% and, as such, the only party entitled to receive the revenues attributable to that working interest. Thus, Suard Barge claims that it has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this declaratory action. Thus, as a potential beneficiary of a proportion of this working interest, Suard Barge claims to have a direct financial interest in the action.
On Wednesday, March 16, 2005, this Court heard oral argument on the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the matter back to state court. After considering the legal memoranda submitted by the parties, all of the evidence, the arguments advanced by counsel, and the law, the Court granted the motion and remanded the case back to state court. Cedyco now asks the Court to reconsider its ruling and find that the matter is properly before this Court.
In support of its motion, Cedyco claims that the Plaintiff's suit, though captioned a declaratory action, is not really a declaratory action. Though this is a new argument advanced by Cedyco, the core issue is precisely the same advanced by Cedyco at oral argument. That is, Cedyco claims that the Plaintiff filed suit to re-litigate Cedyco's ownership rights and added the non-diverse defendants to defeat diversity. However, as the Court noted during oral argument, Cedyco has not presented a shred of evidence to support these allegations. Rather, Cedyco makes broad conclusory statements regarding the Plaintiff's motives and, based on these allegations, asks the Court to find fraudulent joinder. As the Court has already stated, Cedyco has not met its burden. After thorough and careful consideration of the matter, the Court found that the non-diverse parties were properly joined. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Court shall not disturb its ruling.
Accordingly, the Court finds Cedyco's Motion to be without merit.
II. Conclusion
IT IS ORDERED that the Cedyco's Motion for New Trial should be and hereby is DENIED.