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JOHN MUN, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA at ANCHORAGE; RICK WEEMS; RON KAMAHELE; and MARY HOWARD, Defendants.

ORDER FROM CHAMBERS

JOHN SEDWICK, District Judge

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 24, Rick Weems and Mary Howard ("Defendants") move to dismiss the claims against them under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). At docket 29, John Mun opposes the motion. Oral argument has not been requested, and it would not assist the court.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- 2000e-17 (2003).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss an opposing party's claim for relief on the ground that it is not based on a cognizable legal theory or does not allege facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory. In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court will take as true the complaint's factual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The court will examine conclusory allegations to determine whether they follow from the facts alleged. The court will dismiss a claim only if it is beyond doubt that the party pleading the claim will not be able to prove facts that would entitle it to relief.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Brian Clewer, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 782, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1986)).

Vignolo, 120 F.3d at 1077 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Mun claims that defendants violated Title VII by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and retaliating against him for complaining about their alleged discrimination. Defendants move to dismiss those claims on the ground that only employers, not individual employees, may be sued under Title VII. In response, Mun concedes that Ninth Circuit case law establishes that individual employees are not liable for damages under Title VII. But, he argues that the case law does not bar an action against individual employees for injunctive relief.

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees based on their employees' race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. If employers intentionally discriminate on a basis prohibited by Title VII, they are liable for compensatory and punitive damages. In addition, the court may enjoin them from discriminating and order them to reinstate employees they have fired, with or without back pay.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).

Id. § 1981a(a)(1).

Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

In Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that under Title VII damages are available only against employers and not individual employees. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of such a person. . . ." This definition suggests a corporation's executives, supervisors, and other agents, in addition to the corporation itself, are liable for damages. Nevertheless, the Miller court reasoned that Congress included agents within the definition of employer to "incorporate respondeat superior liability into" Title VII, rather than to impose liability on individual employees.

991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

991 F.2d at 587 (quoting district court).

Although Miller requires that the court dismiss Mun's claims for damages against defendants, the Miller court did not address whether injunctive relief is available against individual employees like defendants. Injunctive and other equitable relief is available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), which provides that:

[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice . . ., the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, [including] reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer . . . responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

In Padway v. Palches, the Ninth Circuit interpreted this section as imposing liability for back pay on employers, not individual employees.

665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982).

After considering Padway and Miller, the court concludes that injunctive relief against individual employees is not available under Title VII. The Padway court interpreted "employer" from the clause relating to back pay in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), quoted above, as excluding individual employees. The sentence in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) addressing back pay also makes injunctive relief available against a "respondent." The definition of respondent includes an "employer." Consequently, Mun's argument that injunctive relief is available against individual employees requires employer to mean two things — just the employer (for back pay) and the employer and individual employees (for injunctive relief) — within one sentence in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). The court will not interpret employer in this manner because "[t]here is nothing on the face of [Title VII] or in its legislative history that justifies the creation of drastic and categorical distinctions between [back pay and injunctive relief]."

Id.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(n).

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 (1975).

Also, the conclusion that injunctive relief is not available against individual employees is consistent with the policy rationale underlying the Miller court's decision. The Miller court reasoned that imposing liability for damages on individual employees was not necessary to effect Title VII's purpose because "[n]o employer will allow supervisory or other personnel to violate Title VII when the employer is liable for the Title VII violation." Similarly, no employer will allow its employees to continue unlawful discrimination if a court enjoins the employer from discriminating.

991 F.2d at 588.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, the motion at docket 24 is GRANTED. The Title VII claims against Weems and Howard in Counts II and III of Mun's complaint are DISMISSED.

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MUN v. UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA
(Apr 4, 2005)