DAVID HAMILTON, District Judge
Plaintiff Barry Seagrave ("Seagrave") claimed in this action that the United States has improperly levied on his wages in order to collect Seagrave's income tax liability for the tax years 1989 and 1990. His contention was that the United States' levy was issued after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. In a Judgment entered on the clerk's docket on December 8, 2004, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The reason for this disposition was that a claim for refund had not been presented to the Internal Revenue Service prior to the filing of this case, and hence the jurisdictional requirements necessary for him to assert a claim against the United States were absent. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602 (1990) ("[U]nless a claim for a refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for a refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been erroneously, illegally or wrongfully collected, §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Through his motion to re-open filed on March 29, 2005, Seagrave recites that, following the dismissal of this action, he filed a Form 843 with the Internal Revenue Service seeking a refund of his income tax liability for the tax years 1989 and 1990. This claim was denied. He states, therefore, that because he has now satisfied the claim requirement, the action should be re-opened.
Seagrave's situation is analogous to that of the plaintiff in McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). McNeil, who also proceeded without counsel, filed a lawsuit against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Claimants seeking to bring an action under the FTCA against the United States for money damages must first present the claim to the appropriate agency and have the claim finally denied by the agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). McNeil's lawsuit was filed before his claim had been denied by the federal agency to which it had been presented. The Supreme Court held that filing a premature federal action does not satisfy the statute's exhaustion requirement because the administrative claim must be denied before the federal suit is instituted. Id. at 111-13.
This court draws from McNeil the rule that, where an action is filed against the United States without having satisfied a jurisdictional claims process, and where that claims process is completed during the pendency of the suit, or in this case after the suit is filed, the suit may not continue or be re-opened, but a new suit must be filed.
On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, Seagrave's motion to re-open is denied. He may refile his claim through a new action if he is so inclined.
So ordered.