SIMMONS v. CITY OF PARIS

LEONARD DAVIS, District Judge

Before the Court is Lamar County, Texas's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 105). Having considered the parties' written submissions, the Court GRANTS Lamar County's motion.

On June 29, 2002, several City of Paris police officers and Lamar County Deputy Sheriff Chris Brooks attempted to execute a search warrant at suspected drug dealer Nicky Highnight's residence in Paris, Texas. Although the search warrant was for Highnight's house at 400 14th Street, the officers entered Plaintiffs' home at 410 14th Street instead. Plaintiffs Charlie Simmons and Charlotte Handley, on their own behalf and as next friends for their children Dustin Handley and Angelica Handley, bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the City of Paris police officers, the City of Paris, the Lamar County Deputy Sheriff, and Lamar County conducted an unreasonable search of their home and seizure of their persons under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

This Court granted the individual officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to their entrance into the Plaintiffs' home, which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding issues of material fact, this Court denied the individual officers' motion as to the length of time they remained in Plaintiffs' home. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision except as to two officers who did not enter the home. This Court then dismissed all claims against those two officers. Lamar County now moves for summary judgment.

Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "An issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1999). Although all evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the nonmoving party may not rely on unsubstantiated assertions or speculation, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Rushing v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999).

Municipal liability under 28 U.S.C. section 1983 requires proof of three elements: (1) a policymaker, (2) an official policy, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). An official policy may be an officially adopted and promulgated policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision. Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). An official policy may also be a persistent, widespread practice of city officials that is so common and well settled it fairly represents municipal policy. Id. The municipality's governing body or policy-making authority must have actual or constructive knowledge of the custom. Id. To prove that the municipality was the "moving force" of the constitutional violation, the plaintiff must show the municipality acted with culpability and a direct causal link between the municipal action and the constitutional violation. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 387, 404 (1997). If liability is based on a facially lawful municipal custom or policy, the plaintiff must show the municipality acted with "deliberate indifference" as to its act's known and obvious consequences. Id. at 407. This is a stringent standard of fault that must be adhered to in order to prevent collapsing municipality liability into respondeat superior. Id. at 410, 415.

Plaintiffs allege four reasons to find that Lamar County is deliberately indifferent to its actions' affect on constitutional rights. Plaintiffs first allege that Lamar County does not monitor prosecutions to determine whether they have been compromised by improper searches and seizures. Second, Plaintiffs allege Lamar County's failure to adopt any search and seizure policy suggests deliberate indifference. Third, Plaintiffs allege Lamar County's failure to adopt any supervision policy suggests deliberate indifference. Finally, Plaintiffs allege Lamar County requires only the minimum state-required training, suggesting deliberate indifference.

Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that raises a fact question to Lamar County's culpability or causal role. Plaintiffs have not presented any facts that indicate the known or obvious consequence of Lamar County's actions or inactions would be a constitutional violation. Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, and showing even heightened negligence does not suffice to prove municipal liability. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579. Plaintiffs have also not presented any facts that suggest a direct causal link between any County policy and the incident in question.

Plaintiffs claim that Lamar County's failure to track when improper searches and seizures compromise prosecutions suggests Lamar County's deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs have not alleged that there is a pattern in Lamar County of such compromised prosecutions. Plaintiffs have also not presented any facts that raise a question of whether the decision to not track cases was made with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious risk that not doing so could result in a constitutional violation. Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged how not tracking such cases was a "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violation here.

Next, Plaintiffs allege Lamar County's lack of search and seizure policy suggests deliberate indifference. Lamar County's Chief Deputy testified by affidavit that the County's policy is to comply with the United States Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to contradict this. Nor have Plaintiffs presented any evidence to indicate that more might be necessary to avoid a known or obvious risk of constitutional violations.

Third, Plaintiffs allege Lamar County's lack of supervision policy suggests deliberate indifference. Lamar County's Chief Deputy also testified that Lamar County supervises its officers through a chain of command structure. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to suggest that Lamar County ignored a known or obvious risk of constitutional violations in its decision to not adopt a more formal policy. Plaintiffs have also not presented any evidence to demonstrate that this caused the alleged constitutional violation, given that Officer Brooks was assigned to a task force and not under the County's direct supervision during the incident.

Finally, Plaintiffs' allegation that Lamar County's training requirements suggests deliberate indifference also fails to raise a question of material fact. To establish municipal liability based on a failure to train, a plaintiff must show: (1) inadequate training procedures; (2) inadequate training caused the constitutional violation; and (3) municipal policymakers' deliberate indifference. Pineda, 291 F.3d at 331-32. Inadequate training cannot be proven simply by showing that an injury could have been avoided if an officer had better or more training. Id. at 333 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)). The fact that an officer makes a mistake says little about his training or the legal basis for holding a municipality liable. Id. Further, "a rule of `no special training = deficient training' must be rejected because it `would ignore the training the officers did receive . . . [in] basic recruit training. . . .'" Id. at 334 (quoting Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1345 (7th Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original). A pattern of unconstitutional conduct may put policy makers on notice that training is inadequate, and continued adherence to the training may show deliberate indifference. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-08. Plaintiffs have not presented any proof of any other unconstitutional conduct by other Lamar County officers. Plaintiffs fail to present any facts raising material fact questions as to any of these three elements. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' assertions of municipal liability.

For the reasons described above, Plaintiffs do not raise a genuine issue of material fact as Lamar County's municipal liability. Because Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that raises a material fact question regarding Lamar County's causation or culpability for the incident in question, Lamar County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Lamar County's motion for summary judgment.