Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs to the plaintiff, and the motion is denied.
A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered upon his or her default in appearing or answering a complaint must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense ( see Mount Sinai Hosp. of Queens v. Hertz Corp., 3 AD3d 523, 524; Thattil v. Mondesir, 275 AD2d 408, 409; Manigat v. Louis, 262 AD2d 289). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Thattil v. Mondesir, supra).
Contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default. Service of process was properly effectuated on him pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) at the correct address. The additional mailing required by CPLR 3215 (g) (3) (i), although sent to the wrong address, was forwarded to the defendant's correct address and was received by him more than 20 days before the entry of judgment against him. Moreover, the defendant's conclusory allegations of breach of the noncompetition clause in the parties' stock purchase agreement did not demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense to his default under the separate obligations set forth in the promissory note ( see Neuhaus v. McGovern, 293 AD2d 727, 728; Reilly-Whiteman, Inc. v. Cherry Hill Textiles, 191 AD2d 486, 487; Lener v. Club Med, 168 AD2d 433, 435; Caton v. Lloyd, 138 AD2d 442; cf. Vecchio v. Colangelo, 274 AD2d 469, 471).
In view of the foregoing determination, the defendant's contentions have been rendered academic.