WILLIAM BROWN, Bankruptcy Judge
On October 27, 1994, a judgment was entered in this court, ordering that a debt of $58,000.00 plus statutory interest was excepted from discharge. Since there is no specific federal statute of limitations on how long this judgment is effective, the parties agree that we must look to Tennessee law. See, e.g., Szybist v. Aircraft Acquisition Corp. (Taylorcraft Aviation Corp.), 163 B.R. 734, 738 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1993). Under applicable Tennessee law, an action on a judgment must be taken within 10 years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(2); Brown, MacLean and Ahern, 16 Tenn. Practice § 27.01 (1998).
This limitation period may be extended, however, under applicable Tennessee procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) provides that where there is no controlling federal rule or statute, the procedure for execution of judgments and actions related to judgments "shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought. . . ." See also Ahern and MacLean, Bankruptcy Procedure Manual § 7069.02 (2004 ed.). The relevant procedure is found in Tennessee's Rule of Civil Procedure 69.04, which was amended as of July 1, 2004, to provide:
Within ten years from entry of a judgment, the judgment creditor whose judgment remains unsatisfied may move the court for an order requiring the judgment debtor to show cause why the judgment should not be extended for an additional ten years. A copy of the order shall be mailed by the judgment creditor to the last known address of the judgment debtor. If sufficient cause is not shown within thirty days of mailing, another order shall be entered extending the judgment for an additional ten years. . . .
Against this backdrop of law and procedure, the following took place:
1. On October 22, 2004, the judgment creditors' attorney hand delivered to the bankruptcy court clerk's office in Jackson, Tennessee, a "Complaint for Writ of Scire Facias and Revivor of Judgment." Since this court began requiring electronic filing of documents before that date, the attorney included in the delivery a disk containing an electronic version of the complaint.
2. According to the undisputed affidavit of that attorney, the clerk returned the disk with a notice that the complaint was being returned due to the clerk's requirement that a motion to reopen the closed case be filed before the complaint would be accepted for filing.
3. Following that notice, the creditors' attorney filed a motion to reopen the closed case and/or adversary proceeding, to which the debtor's attorney objected. This court entered an order on March 2, 2005, reopening the closed adversary proceeding in order to reach the merits of whether the judgment should be renewed, with the order conditioned upon the creditors paying the required reopening fee. That fee has been paid, along with the filing of the creditors' "Motion to Renew Judgment." Apparently, the creditors have elected to proceed with their motion rather than with the original complaint.
4. The motion recites the same facts as found in the previously tendered complaint, essentially saying that the judgment creditors have received no payment on the judgment from any source and that interest