Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Having received a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 and having failed to comply with the notice by filing a note of issue or by moving, before the default date, either to vacate the notice or to extend the 90-day period, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious cause of action ( see Allen v. Makhnevich, 15 AD3d 425, 426; Tietz v. Blatt, 280 AD2d 469; Basso v. Lessings Inc., 274 AD2d 488, 489). The plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable excuse for her default in complying with the 90-day notice ( see Palermo v. County of Nassau, 266 AD2d 365, 366; Guang Jing Chen v. Goldstein, 246 AD2d 407, 408). Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide a showing of merit by one with personal knowledge of the facts ( see Tietz v. Blatt, supra; Duqmaq v. Stewart, 137 AD2d 653; cf. Salch v. Paratore, 60 NY2d 851). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate her default in complying with the 90-day notice and to restore the action to the trial calendar, and in granting the defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint.