Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff leave to renew ( see CPLR 2221 [e]; Daniel Perla Assoc. v. Ginsberg, 256 AD2d 303).
Further, reargument was appropriate since the appellants failed to make a prima facie showing, upon the original motion, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident ( see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). One medical report submitted by the appellants was unaffirmed and therefore inadmissible ( see Gleason v. Huber, 188 AD2d 581; Pagano v. Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268, 270). A second report, by an acupuncturist, who was not a medical doctor, was inadmissible since it was not in affidavit form ( see CPLR 2106; Norris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 116 Misc 2d 296). The remaining reports submitted by the appellants were insufficient to show the absence of a serious injury ( see Black v. Robinson, 305 AD2d 438; see also Zavala v. DeSantis, 1 AD3d 354; Gamberg v. Romeo, 289 AD2d 525; Junco v. Ranzi, 288 AD2d 440). In light of the appellants' failure to establish a prima facie case, it becomes unnecessary to inquire into the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of the plaintiff's opposition ( see Coscia v. 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d 538; Mariaca-Olmos v. Mizrhy, 226 AD2d 437).