DAVID BRIONES, District Judge
On this day, the Court considered Defendants Davis Technologies, LLC, Shannon R. Davis and Rachel N. Davis's "Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction And Brief In Support" ("Motion to Dismiss"), filed in the above-captioned cause on February 11, 2005. On April 27, 2005, Plaintiff Autotronic Controls Corporation filed a "Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss" ("Response"). On May 9, 2005, Defendants filed a Reply. On May 24, 2005, Plaintiff filed a "Surreply Regarding Defendants' Motion To Dismiss" ("Surreply"). After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff manufactures and sells high performance ignition systems under the federally registered trademark "MSD." Those ignition systems are manufactured for use in competitive racing and are approved for competition by various racing associations. One of these ignition systems is specifically manufactured to the specifications of the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing ("NASCAR") and is approved by NASCAR sanctioned races. Defendants buy Plaintiff's ignition systems and insert traction control devices, which are not permitted by NASCAR. On February 1, 2005, Plaintiff filed its complaint alleging trademark infringement and false designation of origin in violation of the Lanham Act, under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and 1125. Through the instant cause of action, Plaintiff seeks recovery of actual damages and Defendants' profits resulting from and caused by Defendants' "wrongful acts." Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendants' advertising and selling traction control devices hidden inside two of Plaintiff's ignition systems. At the time when this cause of action was instituted, the traction control devices were installed in such a way that would avoid detection by racing officials. Plaintiff avers that by such installation, Defendants infringe Plaintiff's trademark and falsely designate the origin of their traction control device. Defendants concede that in December 2004, they sold, and subsequently shipped, such a device to a customer located in El Paso, Texas.
On February 2, 2005 the Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") which enjoined Defendants from "altering, modifying, selling, advertising or promoting altered or modified Autotronic ignition systems[.]" On February 14, 2005, the Court conducted a hearing, which resulted in it entering an Agreed Preliminary Injunction ("API"). Wherein, the API extinguished the TRO and ordered Defendants to place a notice on any of Plaintiff's ignition systems that they modify. On April 6, 2005, the Court conducted a Status Conference to determine the precise language of future modification notices and the manner in which Defendant would affixed such notices to Plaintiff's products. After hearing argument from both Parties, the Court ordered Defendants to engrave a notice on the exterior of Plaintiff's products that it modifies and later resells.
DISCUSSION
Defendants do not dispute that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiff's Lanham Act claims. However, they do challenge whether the Court maintains personal jurisdiction over them with respect to Plaintiff's claims for damages.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Rule 12(b)(2) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for the court's personal jurisdiction over that defendant. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1990). On a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted facts must be taken as true, while those facts at issue must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 217. For Defendants to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Court, the exercise of that jurisdiction must be consistent with due process under the Constitution of the United States. Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999).
Under the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant when (1) the defendant has purposely availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with that state, and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Mink, 109 F.3d at 336 (citing Intern'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)). "The defendant's connection with the forum state should be such that [it] reasonably should anticipate being haled into court there." Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1980)).
(1) Minimum Contacts
A defendant's minimum contacts with a forum state may give rise to either specific or general personal jurisdiction. Marathon Oil, 182 F.3d at 295. The exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate where the minimum contacts "arise from or are directly related to the cause of action." Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984)). A single sale of a trademarked product in violation of the Lanham Act in the forum is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Sinko v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 603 F.Supp. 649 (W.D. Tex. 1984); Finck Cigar Co. v. El Duque Group, Inc., No. Civ.A. SA99CA0817EP, 2001 WL 33348253, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2000).
Here, Defendants admit that they installed a traction control system inside Plaintiff's ignition system in North Carolina, then sold it to a customer in Texas. In an effort to buttress their opposition to jurisdiction, Defendants emphasize that this one transaction was actually initiated by the purchaser in Texas by telephone or mail. For its part, Plaintiff provides more details regarding the aforementioned transaction. According to Plaintiff, the sale and shipment of the altered ignition to Barnett Harley Davidson in El Paso, TX in December 2004 by Defendants, constitutes the commission of a tort in Texas by Defendants. Plaintiff vehemently posits that this one sale of a trademarked product violates the Lanham Act. As a consequence of this one violation, Plaintiff galvanizes the position that Defendants are subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction over them. The Court agrees with Plaintiff's analysis.
Defendants further concede that from their pool of past customers, who reside in forty-four different states, 2.6 percent of have been from Texas.
The basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendants is birthed from their acts in selling and shipping an infringing product to a Texas customer. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state because they sold a trademarked product in violation of the Lanham Act within Texas.
(2) Fair Play and Substantial Justice
When analyzing whether or not the exercise of personal jurisdiction offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, "[a] court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination `the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.'" Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564).
In this case, Defendants argue that litigating this case in Texas would serve as a substantial burden on them because their company is a "two person operation," which would result in the shutting down of the business. Additionally, Defendants complain that bringing their two young children with them to Texas for the duration of trial would prove to be burdensome. Defendants raise no other argument in support of their position that the assumption of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. While Plaintiff does not directly address these potential burdens on the Defendants, the Court ultimately finds Defendant's arguments unpersuasive.
Even though Plaintiff did not broach the topic, Texas has an interest in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state residents. Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion that the burden of requiring Defendants to litigate in Texas is not much greater than the burden requiring Plaintiff to litigate in North Carolina. The Court is unconvinced that any possible inconveniences that Defendants may encounter outweigh Plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in the case at bar. In the final analysis, the Court is of the opinion that the interests of the forum State far outweigh the Defendant's pleas for dismissal. Finally, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the assumption of jurisdiction would be against the interstate judicial system's interest in the efficient resolution of controversies. Thus, the Court is of the opinion that asserting personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in this case would not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that it may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants in the instant case. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Davis Technologies, LLC, Shannon R. Davis and Rachel N. Davis's "Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction And Brief In Support" is DENIED.