PHILIP MARTINEZ, District Judge
On this day, the Court considered Plaintiffs' "Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration" ("Motion"), filed on November 15, 2004, Defendant United States of America's "Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial," filed on November 15, 2004, and Plaintiffs' "Supplement to Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration," filed on December 27, 2004, in the above-captioned cause. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration should be denied for the reasons that follow.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 21, 2004, the Court, by letter ruling, granted the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, determining that Plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act medical negligence claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court entered Final Judgment for the Government on November 3, 2004. The Court subsequently issued a Memorandum Opinion granting the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2005.
The Court notes that its Final Judgment Order incorrectly references 18 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The correct citations should be to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), respectively.
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider its ruling granting the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, and set the case for trial.
II. DISCUSSION
"While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration, such a motion may be considered . . . a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment." Shepard v. Int'l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 328 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court evaluates the instant motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to amend or alter judgment. Rule 59(e) motions "serve the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Relief under Rule 59(e) is also appropriate where there has been a change in controlling law, Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir. 2003), or to prevent manifest injustice. Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1322, 1333 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (citations omitted). "Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly." Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Also, a Rule 59(e) motion "is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment." Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs present two lines of argument in support of the instant motion. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Court improperly granted the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment by neglecting to hold an oral hearing on the summary judgment motion and by not affording Plaintiffs ten days advance notice of the date the Court would consider the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ("The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing."). However, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected the contentions proffered by Plaintiffs. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 545-46 (5th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996); Daniels v. Morris, 746 F.2d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1984).
[Rule 56(c)] does not by implication require the district court to hold an oral hearing. As we have previously interpreted it, the rule requires only that, if there is an oral hearing, there be ten-days advance notice; if there is not a hearing, the adverse party must have at least ten days to respond to the motion for summary judgment. . . . Rule 56(c) does not require that a party be given advance notice of a "date certain" on which a motion for summary judgment is to be decided by the trial court.
Daniels, 746 F.2d at 274-75 (footnote and citations omitted). "Rule 56(c) merely requires the court to give the non-movant an adequate opportunity to respond prior to a ruling."
Jackson, 99 F.3d at 713.
In this case, the Court followed Local Rule CV-7(d), which gives a party eleven days to respond to another party's motion. W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-7(d) ("If any party opposes a motion, the respondent shall file a response and supporting documents as are then available within eleven (11) days of service of the motion."). Thus, Plaintiffs had more than the ten days advance notice required under Rule 56(c). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that "[t]he local rules of the Western District of Texas . . . satisfy the notice requirements of Rule 56(c) by requiring that a response to a summary judgment motion be filed within a specified period of time." Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 346 F.3d at 546 (footnote and citations omitted).
The Court also notes that Plaintiffs did, in fact, respond to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, and were later able to supplement their responsive pleading, before the Court ruled on the summary judgment motion. See Plaintiff's Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant United States of America (Docket No. 49); Plaintiff's Supplement to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 43). Lastly, Local Rule CV-7(g) clearly states that oral hearings on motions are granted solely at the discretion of the Court. W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-7(g) ("A movant or respondent may specifically request an oral hearing, but the allowance of an oral hearing shall be within the sole discretion of the judge to whom the motion is assigned."). Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' contentions that the Court erred in granting the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment due to lack of an oral hearing on the motion or lack of adequate notice under Rule 56(c) are without merit.
Plaintiffs' second line of argument essentially seeks to re-litigate the merits of the summary judgment proceedings by rehashing arguments and resubmitting evidence from their initial and supplemental responses to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court's Memorandum Opinion Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 56) adequately addresses the substantive arguments made by Plaintiffs in the instant motion. Plaintiffs fail to show a manifest error of law or fact, have not submitted any new material evidence for the Court's consideration, and do not otherwise demonstrate any other grounds for reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling. Therefore, the Court declines to revisit its decision concluding that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act statute of limitations and that the Government is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
The only materials Plaintiffs have submitted that were not either considered by the Court or available to the Plaintiffs during the summary judgment proceedings were Nita Haynes-Johnson's deposition errata sheet changes. However, the errata sheet changes, even if accepted by the Court, relate only to an issue the Court has already determined to be immaterial to the Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Government. See Memorandum Opinion Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 56), at 44 n. 41. Thus, the errata sheet changes provide no basis for reconsideration of the Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Government.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs do not argue that the law controlling the case has changed.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis of facts and legal principles, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' "Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration" is DENIED.