The trial court erred in setting aside the jury's finding that plaintiff suffered a serious injury as a result of the accident. Although the court purported to do so on the basis that the finding was against the weight of the credible evidence, it actually did so on the basis that the finding was not supported by legally sufficient evidence as a matter of law ( see CPLR 4404 [a]). The standard for making that determination is "that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial." ( Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499.) That standard was not met here.
The MRI films and the testimony of plaintiff and his experts provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to validly conclude that the September 11, 1999 accident caused plaintiff to suffer a serious injury resulting in permanent consequential limitation of the use of his neck. Plaintiff testified as to how his neck was injured in the September 11, 1999 accident, the 16 months of treatment he received, his inability to work for five months and his limited work schedule thereafter, and his subsequent inability to engage in physical activities that he had previously enjoyed. Dr. Ginde, a board-certified radiologist, testified that the MRI films, taken six days after the accident and admitted into evidence, showed that plaintiff had suffered traumatic injury to his cervical spine, including straightening and reversal of the normal curvature of the spine, disc herniation, and mild compression of the thecal sac and spinal cord. After examining plaintiff and reviewing the MRI films, Dr. Rose, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, testified that plaintiff had suffered two herniated cervical discs as a direct result of the trauma from the accident, with one disc impinging upon a nerve root. He opined that these injuries resulted in a chronic, permanent condition, including an objective, quantified decrease in the range of motion of his cervical spine.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the jury's damage awards deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation and should be reduced to the extent indicated (CPLR 5501 [c]).