RALPH BEISTLINE, District Judge
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs seeking to prevent the sale of one business to another that allegedly violates federal antitrust law. Crowley Marine Services, Inc. ("Crowley"), a supplier of bulk fuel to Western Alaska, seeks to purchase Yukon Fuel Company ("Yukon"), a similar company. Plaintiffs argue that the sale violates federal antitrust laws because its effect "may be substantially to lessen competition."
Clerk's Docket No. 2 at 3.
Id.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18).
Before the Court reaches the merits of whether a temporary restraining order should be granted, the Court must consider whether it may be involved in this dispute at all.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is not the first instance where a court has considered the potential antitrust ramifications of this sale. In November of 2003, Plaintiffs filed an antitrust lawsuit in Alaska State Court to stop the sale. In March of 2004, the Alaska Attorney General initiated a formal investigation of the contemplated transaction. The State Court stayed its action until completion of this investigation. The Attorney General's investigation included interviewing people involved in large transportation services, retaining an antitrust economist to review relevant documents, meeting with the City of Bethel, the utility groups, and Plaintiffs, and consulting with antitrust attorneys in other states and federal authorities. As a result, the Attorney General determined that modifying the sale was necessary to avoid state anti-trust violations. Thus, at the end of the eight month investigation, a consent decree was reached that allowed the sale of Yukon to go forward as long as Crowley divested certain assets and provided other accommodations to Delta Western, another supplier of bulk fuel in western Alaska. The consent decree was then published and subjected to a public comment period. The State then initiated its own complaint in State Superior Court alleging that the sale would be an antitrust violation, but that its proposed consent decree would remedy the violation.
After the expiration of the comment period, the State Superior Court proceeded to have a hearing where Plaintiffs presented their arguments, the Assistant Attorney General presented his comments, and expert economists were heard. On August 25, 2005, State Superior Court Judge Ben Esch issued his opinion approving consent decree and allowing the sale to proceed. Judge Esch concluded that the sale was in the public interest. This Court has reviewed Judge Esch's opinion and found it thoughtful, thorough, and well-reasoned.
While the court limited its review to determine whether the settlement was within the reaches of the public interest, it was not a rubber-stamp and the court considered: "(1) the degree to which the decree achieves the relief sought in the complaint; (2) the nature of the case, including the size of the defendant, the scope and complexity of the proposed settlement, and the importance of the case to the economy as a whole; (3) the quantity and quality of information available to the court on which to base an evaluation of the decree, including the competitive impact statement, public comment and government responses, and any pretrial discovery and trial evidence actually presented; (4) any prior or current history of attempts by the same parties to evade public scrutiny of alleged anti-competitive practices." Clerk's Docket No. 12 at Ex. A at 6.
While Plaintiffs were not a party to the lawsuit, they were participants and were parties to a companion lawsuit that raised identical issues. Furthermore, the Attorney General provided them documentary evidence and they submitted formal objections to the court and participated in the hearing.
Plaintiffs now wish this Court to issue a temporary restraining order preventing the sale while it considers whether the sale, as modified by the consent decree, is a violation of federal antitrust law. In so doing, this Court would effectively prevent the judgment of the State Superior Court from taking effect. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, "precludes federal courts from enjoining state court actions unless (1) Congress has expressly authorized such relief by statute, (2) an injunction is necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction, or (3) an injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate the court's judgments." "In the interest of comity and federalism, these three exceptions must be strictly construed." Therefore, "doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy." The Act applies to any stage of state proceedings, including judgments and appeals. Additionally, "[i]t makes no difference whether the injunction applies to the private litigants or is imposed directly on the State Court itself.
Alton Box Board Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (9th 1982) (quotations omitted).
Id. at 1271.
Id. (citation omitted).
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
Alton Box Board Co. v. Espirit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982).
Here, Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order that would preclude the State Court's decision approving the sale from taking effect. Thus, the Act applies to prohibit this Court from so acting, unless an exception to the Act applies, which does not appear to be the case here. First, there has been no statutory authorization by Congress for the relief sought by Plaintiffs. Second, such an order is not necessary to aid the Court's jurisdiction. Third, such an order is not necessary to protect or effectuate a judgment of the Federal District Court. Thus, it appears that this Court is likely barred from granting the relief requested by Plaintiffs.
Moreover, after having reviewed the briefs and documentation supplied by the parties, and noting the extensive nature of the investigation and litigation that led to the consent decree and subsequent State Court decision, and without even considering the issue of collateral estoppel, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown probable success on the merits or that there is a high degree of irreparable harm, which is critical to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Earth Island Inst. V. United States Forest Service, 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003).
Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
This is not to say that Plaintiffs' complaint lacks merit or that Plaintiffs will ultimately fail. Indeed, although Defendants are not precluded from proceeding with the sales transaction, they do so with full knowledge of the pending litigation and its potential consequences.