MARTIN v. BARRETT

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Docket Number

S05A0856.

Attorney(S)

Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jason C. Fisher, James J. Phillips, Assistant Attorneys General, William P. Rowe III, for appellant. Michael S. Katz, for appellee.

Judges

CARLEY, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Michael Barrett was convicted in 1998 of aggravated child molestation and two counts of cruelty to children, represented by public defenders. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion. In 2002, Barrett filed a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The habeas court granted relief, finding that Barrett's trial attorneys failed to investigate his mental health history despite being notified of his prior hospitalization for mental illness. The Warden appealed the habeas court's decision pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-52(c).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Barrett's trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his mental health history despite notice of his prior hospitalization.
Whether the failure to investigate Barrett's mental health prejudiced him to the extent that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome under the appropriate legal standards.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The Warden relied solely on the testimony of Barrett's trial attorneys that their discussions with Barrett indicated he was in good mental health.
The attorneys contended that their evaluation of Barrett's sanity was sufficient and that further investigation was unnecessary.

Appellee's Arguments

Barrett argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain medical records or request a mental health evaluation despite knowledge of his prior hospitalization.
He asserted that this failure was due to inattention rather than strategic decision-making, violating the duty to investigate.
He further contended that the lack of investigation prejudiced him because psychiatric evidence showed a reasonable probability he could have been found legally insane, incompetent to stand trial, or guilty but mentally ill.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)	Standard for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring deficient performance and prejudice.	Guided the court's framework for evaluating counsel's failure to investigate Barrett's mental health and resulting prejudice.
Head v. Taylor, 273 Ga. 69 (2000)	Acceptance of habeas court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous; application of legal principles independently.	Used to affirm the habeas court's findings and to compare inadequate investigation of mental health issues.
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)	Defense counsel's duty to conduct reasonable investigation; strategic choices after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable.	Supported the conclusion that failure to investigate Barrett's mental health was unreasonable and deficient.
Rompilla v. Beard, ___ U.S. ___ (2005)	Reaffirmed principles regarding counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence.	Reinforced the standard for investigation duties in non-capital cases.
Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1988)	Reasonableness of foregoing mental health investigation in non-capital cases when expert finds defendant fit or sane.	Distinguished from Barrett's case where no such expert determination was made.
Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002)	Failure to investigate known psychiatric history constitutes ineffective assistance.	Supported the finding that Barrett's counsel's failure was deficient given known mental health history.
Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1990)	Counsel cannot rely on lay evaluation of sanity once investigation is warranted; duty to investigate mental health issues.	Applied to reject the Warden's argument that counsel's lay assessment sufficed.
Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434 (2003)	Support for habeas relief based on inadequate investigation of mental health in death penalty cases.	Used to contextualize the duty to investigate mental health evidence.
Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208 (1998)	Support for habeas relief for inadequate mental health investigation.	Referenced in assessing Barrett's expert testimony and prejudice.
Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226 (1998)	Support for relief based on counsel's deficient performance regarding mental health evidence.	Used to support the court's reasoning on ineffective assistance.
Schofield v. Gulley, 279 Ga. 413 (2005)	Clarifies that the burden is to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome, not certainty.	Applied to the prejudice analysis in Barrett's case.
Huzzie v. State, 236 Ga. App. 192 (1999)	Referenced in comparison to Barrett's mental health evidence.	Used to contrast the strength of Barrett's expert testimony.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied the two-prong Strickland standard, requiring deficient performance and prejudice. It accepted the habeas court's factual findings that Barrett's attorneys were notified of his mental health hospitalization but failed to obtain records or request expert evaluation. The court emphasized that strategic choices after thorough investigation are protected, but here, counsel made no investigation, which was unreasonable and resulted from inattention, not strategy. The court rejected the Warden's reliance on counsel's lay assessment of Barrett's mental health, citing precedent that counsel must investigate when there is reason to believe it is warranted.

Regarding prejudice, the court found the psychiatric expert's testimony credible enough to establish a reasonable probability that Barrett could have been found legally insane, incompetent, or guilty but mentally ill. The court acknowledged psychiatry's imprecision but held that Barrett's burden was to show reasonable probability, not certainty. Thus, the court concluded Barrett was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

The court upheld the habeas court's grant of relief, affirming that Barrett's counsel's failure to investigate his mental health was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial. The direct effect is that Barrett's ineffective assistance of counsel claim succeeded, entitling him to relief. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond applying existing standards to the facts of this case.

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MARTIN v. BARRETT.

CARLEY, Justice.

In 1998, Michael Barrett was convicted of aggravated child molestation and two counts of cruelty to children. He was represented by two attorneys who served as public defenders. Barrett's lead attorney at trial, Katie Anderson, also represented him on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Barrett v. State, 244 Ga. App. XXV (2000). In 2002, Barrett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The habeas court granted relief, finding that Ms. Anderson was notified prior to trial that Barrett had been hospitalized for treatment of mental illness, but neither of his attorneys obtained the records or requested an evaluation of him by a mental health expert. The habeas court further found that this failure to investigate was the result of inattention rather than strategic choice and that, but for this deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that Barrett would have been found legally insane at the time of the crimes, incompetent to stand trial, or guilty but mentally ill. The Warden appeals pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-52 (c).

In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), Barrett "must show both deficient performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice. [Cits.]" Head v. Taylor, 273 Ga. 69, 71 (3) ( 538 SE2d 416) (2000). "On appeal, we accept the habeas court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the relevant legal principles to the facts. [Cit.]" Head v. Taylor, supra. The Supreme Court of the United States recently reaffirmed the principles of Strickland as they relate to defense counsel's decisions regarding investigation:

"Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." [Cit.]

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-522 (II) (A) (123 SC 2527, 156 LE2d 471) (2003). See also Rompilla v. Beard, ___ U.S. ___ (125 SC 2456, 162 LE2d 360) (2005).

In death penalty cases, both the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court have upheld the grant of habeas relief based upon trial counsel's insufficient investigation of the defendant's mental health as a possible source of mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase. Wiggins v. Smith, supra; Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434, 435 (1) ( 578 SE2d 426) (2003); Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208, 212 (3) (B) ( 510 SE2d 32) (1998); Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 234 (12) (B) ( 497 SE2d 216) (1998). See also Rompilla v. Beard, supra. In a non-capital case, a decision to forego or curtail the investigation of the accused's mental health is not as likely to be unreasonable. See Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F2d 642, 653 (III) (11th Cir. 1988). Ordinarily, the lack of investigation into a previous mental hospitalization is reasonable when an expert has determined that the defendant is fit to stand trial or that he was sane at the time of the offense. Stephens v. Kemp, supra; People v. Fields, 557 NE2d 629, 634 (Ill.App. 1990). In the absence of such determination, however, "where a defense attorney has received information from a reliable source that his client has had a history of psychiatric problems, but failed to adequately investigate this history, counsel failed to provide effective assistance. [Cits.]" (Emphasis omitted.) Brown v. Sternes, 304 F3d 677, 694 (III) (B) (1) (7th Cir. 2002). A clear majority of the federal circuits have addressed the issue and "arrived at the same conclusion. [Cits.]" Brown v. Sternes, supra.

In Head v. Taylor, supra at 80-82 (2), the defendant's mental illness was an issue not only in the sentencing phase, but also at a competency hearing and during the guilt phase. There, we held that the defense attorneys' investigation was inadequate, because they failed to obtain readily available jail records which were relevant to that issue. If Taylor and Brown represent instances of ineffective assistance, then the case now before us, "where counsel did no investigation whatsoever, must be. . . . It must be a very rare circumstance indeed where a decision not to investigate would be `reasonable' after counsel has notice of the client's history of mental problems." Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F2d 589, 597 (II) (B) (5th Cir. 1990).

The Warden relies only on the testimony of Barrett's trial attorneys that their discussions with him indicated that he was in good mental health. However,

[w]here a condition may not be visible to a layman, counsel cannot depend on his or her own evaluation of someone's sanity once he has reason to believe an investigation is warranted because, where such a condition exists, the defendant's attorney is the sole hope that it will be brought to the attention of the court. (Emphasis in original.)

Bouchillon v. Collins, supra. Here, Barrett's attorney knew of his recent hospitalization and treatment for a mental illness. Thus, defense counsel in this case could not reasonably conclude "that further investigation would have been fruitless." Wiggins v. Smith, supra at 525 (II) (B) (1). An attorney's failure to investigate is unreasonable where, as the habeas court found to be the case here, it resulted from inattention, and not from reasoned strategic judgment. Wiggins v. Smith, supra at 526 (II) (B) (1), 534 (II) (B) (3). We recognize that public defenders work "under difficult conditions. It is very often a thankless undertaking. Nevertheless, there is a duty to investigate which cannot be abridged because counsel is only appointed, not retained." Bouchillon v. Collins, supra. Since the evidence supports the finding that such duty was not fulfilled in this case, the habeas court did not err in concluding that the performance of Barrett's lawyers was deficient.

With respect to the prejudice prong, the habeas court found that readily available psychiatric records show that Barrett suffers from a form of Bipolar I Disorder which includes psychotic episodes of auditory and visual hallucinations. The only expert to testify at the habeas hearing was a properly qualified psychiatrist who reviewed Barrett's medical records and examined him. Although this expert's testimony related to Barrett's mental state years earlier and was not definitive, it nevertheless supported the habeas court's finding of a reasonable probability that, under the appropriate legal standards, Barrett might have been found to be incompetent to stand trial, legally insane at the time of the crimes, or guilty but mentally ill. We understand that psychiatry is an imprecise and imperfect science at best. Brown v. Sternes, supra at 696, 698 (III) (B) (2). However, Barrett's "burden is to show only `a reasonable probability' of a different outcome, not that a different outcome would have been certain or even `more likely than not.' [Cit.]" Schofield v. Gulley, 279 Ga. 413, 416 (I) (A) ( 614 SE2d 740) (2005).

Usually this "what may have been" strategy does nothing more than confirm the truism, irrelevant from an ineffectiveness standpoint, that everything is clearer with hindsight. [Cit.] However, the [testimony] by petitioner's expert in this case [is] significant because [he is] the only mental health expert who examined [Barrett and his] institutional records. . . . (Emphasis in original.)

Turpin v. Lipham, supra at 217 (3) (B), fn. 4. Compare Huzzie v. State, 236 Ga. App. 192, 194 (2), (3) ( 512 SE2d 5) (1999). Accordingly, the habeas court was authorized to find that the second prong of Strickland was met, and to grant relief on the basis that Barrett was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.