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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs and defendants have owned adjoining residential lots since 1986 and 1989, respectively. In 2004, defendants' survey revealed that their deed description included a portion of plaintiffs' side yard (the parcel). Plaintiffs initiated this action seeking a declaration of title to the parcel by adverse possession. Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Warren County Court initially partially granted plaintiffs' motion, recognizing them as owners of the improved portion of the parcel. Defendants later moved to renew the motion based on evidence challenging plaintiffs' claim that their grantor orally described the lot boundaries to include the parcel at the time of purchase. Upon renewal, the County Court found a material question of fact regarding plaintiffs' knowledge about ownership of the parcel, reversed its prior summary judgment ruling as to the "hostile and under claim of right" element of adverse possession, and denied plaintiffs' motion on that ground. Plaintiffs appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether possessors, whose possession is otherwise open, hostile, and continuous for the statutory period, can acquire title by adverse possession despite knowledge that another holds record title.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend 587 (1840) Adverse possession can be established despite possessor's knowledge that they have no right; intent to claim "right or wrong" suffices. Established that knowledge of another's title does not defeat adverse possession; rejected requirement of good-faith belief in ownership.
Harpending v. Minister of Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, 16 Pet [41 US] 455 (1842) Supports the principle that adverse possession can be maintained despite knowledge of another's title. Reinforces the longstanding acceptance of adverse possession despite wrongful claim.
Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf Ch 633 (1847) General support for adverse possession principles. Referenced as part of foundational case law affirming adverse possession doctrine.
Livingston v. Peru Iron Co., 9 Wend 511 (1832) Earlier view requiring good-faith belief in ownership for adverse possession. Explicitly rejected by Humbert as inconsistent with adverse possession doctrine.
Baker v. Oakwood, 123 NY 16 Essence of adverse possession is loss of title due to owner's inaction against open and hostile possession. Supports immateriality of possessor's knowledge of invalidity of claim.
Monnot v. Murphy, 207 NY 240 Possessor's knowledge of invalid title claim does not defeat adverse possession absent acknowledgment of true owner. Applied to confirm that knowledge alone does not negate claim of right.
Bedell v. Shaw, 59 NY 46 Overt acknowledgment of another's title defeats claim of adverse possession. Distinguished to require overt acknowledgment, not mere knowledge.
Guariglia v. Blima Homes, 89 NY2d 851 Acknowledgment of title by possessor negates claim of right. Relied upon to require clear acknowledgment during statutory period to defeat adverse possession.
Van Gorder v. Masterplanned, Inc., 78 NY2d 1106 Oral concession of another's ownership negates claim of right. Supports the principle that acknowledgment cancels adverse possession claim.
Falco v. Pollitts, 298 AD2d 838 Attempt to purchase land constitutes acknowledgment of another's title. Used to illustrate acknowledgment defeats claim of right.
Dittmer v. Jacwin Farms, 224 AD2d 477 Description in deed explicitly excluding disputed parcel constitutes acknowledgment. Supports requirement of overt acknowledgment.
Bernat v. Echo Socy. of Niagara Falls, N.Y., 7 NY2d 914 Statements showing awareness of lack of record title do not defeat claim of right absent disclaimer. Distinguishes knowledge from acknowledgment.
Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 NY 362 Bona fides of occupant's claim not essential; knowledge of wrongfulness immaterial. Supports immateriality of possessor's knowledge.
Barnes v. Light, 116 NY 34 Actual possession and improvement establish claim of title if done without recognition of another's title. Applied to confirm that possession and use demonstrate claim of right.
Nazarian v. Pascale, 225 AD2d 381 Objective test focusing on use and possession rather than subjective intent. Supports court's rejection of subjective intent as dispositive.
Joseph v. Whitcombe, 279 AD2d 122 Possessor's subjective intent matters where acknowledgment of title occurs. Distinguished for cases lacking acknowledgment.
Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 NY 95 Suggests knowledge of another's title may defeat claim of right; considered dictum here. Court declines to follow this view as controlling due to dissent and factual distinctions.
Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 NY 296 Possessor's mistaken belief in ownership does not defeat adverse possession. Supports principle that subjective belief is immaterial.
Fatone v. Vona, 287 AD2d 854 Mistaken possession can ripen into ownership based on outward acts. Affirms focus on visible acts over subjective intent.
Bradt v. Giovannone, 35 AD2d 322 Outward acts of ownership establish hostile claim of right despite mistaken belief. Supports objective test for adverse possession.
West v. Tilley, 33 AD2d 228 Subjective motive irrelevant; possession and improvement control. Supports court's rejection of subjective intent.
Crary v. Goodman, 22 NY 170 Addressed whether mistaken possession disproves hostile claim of right. Supports principle that unintentional possession can be adverse.
Birkholz v. Wells, 272 AD2d 665 Possessors' awareness of lack of ownership does not affect adverse character of possession. Directly applied to reject County Court's reasoning limiting adverse possession.
Harrington v. Estate of Crouse, 1 AD3d 778 Knowledge or belief as to ownership is immaterial to adverse possession claim. Supports rejection of subjective knowledge as defeating adverse possession.
Moore v. City of Saratoga Springs, 296 AD2d 707 Knowledge or belief of possessor irrelevant to claim of adverse possession. Supports court's holding on immateriality of subjective knowledge.
Albright v. Beesimer, 288 AD2d 577 Clear acknowledgment of title in another during statutory period defeats claim. Supports requirement of overt acknowledgment to defeat adverse possession.
Gerlach v. Russo Realty Corp., 264 AD2d 756 Overt acknowledgment negates claim of right. Supports court's distinction between knowledge and acknowledgment.
Reynolds v. Arnold, 221 AD2d 733 Acknowledgment during statutory period defeats adverse possession claim. Supports court's reliance on controlling precedent.
Garrett v. Holcomb, 215 AD2d 884 Acknowledgment required to defeat adverse possession. Supports court's refusal to follow contrary Second Department cases.
Brand v. Prince, 35 NY2d 634 Claim of right requires possession that would support ejectment cause. Clarifies legal meaning of claim of right as hostile possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the doctrine of adverse possession focusing on the "hostile and under claim of right" element. It emphasized that longstanding New York precedent establishes that a possessor's knowledge that another holds legal title does not defeat adverse possession, provided there is no overt acknowledgment of that title during the statutory period. The court distinguished mere knowledge from acknowledgment, noting that only the latter negates hostility required for adverse possession.

The court reviewed seminal cases dating back to the 19th century, including Humbert v. Trinity Church, which explicitly rejected the requirement of good-faith belief in ownership and held that intent to claim title "right or wrong" suffices. It further noted that adverse possession arises from the statutory bar on ejectment claims after prolonged possession, making knowledge of invalid title irrelevant.

The court addressed contrary cases from the Second Department that appeared to find acknowledgment based on mere knowledge after the statutory period, declining to follow them. It reaffirmed that acknowledgment must be clear, overt, and occur within the statutory period to defeat adverse possession.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that plaintiffs consistently asserted ownership and did not overtly acknowledge defendants' title. Therefore, defendants' evidence that plaintiffs knew they did not own the parcel was insufficient to create a material issue of fact regarding the claim of right element. The County Court erred in reversing its prior ruling on this ground.

Holding and Implications

The court modified and reversed the County Court's order to partially grant plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment as to the improved portion of the parcel. The earlier denial of summary judgment on the "hostile and under claim of right" element was reversed, affirming that knowledge of another's title does not defeat adverse possession absent overt acknowledgment.

The direct effect is that plaintiffs are recognized as owners by adverse possession of the improved portion of the parcel. The court did not establish new precedent but reaffirmed and applied well-established New York law distinguishing knowledge from acknowledgment in adverse possession claims.

G. SCOTT WALLING et al., Appellants, v. PAUL F. PRZYBYLO et al., Respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSE, J.

Plaintiffs and defendants have owned adjoining lots in a residential subdivision since 1986 and 1989, respectively. In 2004, defendants had their lot surveyed and learned that their deed description included a portion of plaintiffs' side yard (hereinafter the parcel). Plaintiffs then commenced this action seeking a declaration that they have title to the parcel by adverse possession. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment and County Court, among other things, partially granted plaintiffs' motion, finding them to be the owners of the improved portion of the parcel. Defendants later moved to renew based upon evidence disputing plaintiffs' allegation that, at the time of their purchase, their grantor had orally described the boundaries of their lot to include the parcel. County Court granted the motion to renew and found a material question of fact as to whether plaintiffs had known from the first that they did not own the parcel. The court reasoned that such knowledge, if proven, would be inconsistent with plaintiffs' assertion of possession under a claim of right, one part of the essential "hostile and under claim of right" element of adverse possession. Accordingly, the court reversed its prior determination and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to that element alone. Plaintiffs appeal.

The sole issue raised is whether possessors, whose possession is otherwise open, hostile and continuous for the statutorily-prescribed period of time, can obtain property by adverse possession despite their knowledge that another party holds record title. This question was answered in the affirmative in New York as long ago as 1840 ( see Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend 587, 602-604 [1840]; see also Harpending v. Minister of Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of City of N.Y., 16 Pet [41 US] 455, 471 [1842]; see generally Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf Ch 633, 720-762 [1847]). In Humbert v. Trinity Church ( supra), the court held that ownership can be obtained by adverse possession even where the possessor claims title wrongfully, fraudulently and "with whatever degree of knowledge that he has no right" ( id. at 604). The court's ruling in Humbert, that the " quo animo" (intent) required of an adverse possessor is "the intent to claim at all, right or wrong, with or without knowledge that another has title" ( id. at 611), was an explicit rejection of its earlier view in Livingston v. Peru Iron Co. (9 Wend 511, 518 [1832]) that the possessor had to have a good-faith belief in his or her ownership ( see Humbert v. Trinity Church, supra at 611).

Although defendants state in their brief that they have filed a notice of appeal from Supreme Court's original order partially granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, no such notice is included in the record. In any event, defendants do not argue in response to plaintiffs' appeal that summary judgment should have been denied because of the absence of proof of any element of adverse possession other than possession under claim of right.

This seminal holding rests upon the common-law origin of the doctrine of adverse possession in the bar that arises once the statute of limitations has run on the title holder's cause of action for ejectment of a hostile possessor. The right to assert an ejectment cause of action requires that the title holder has been wrongfully dispossessed ( see 5 Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, Ejectment § 41.34 [5th ed 2004]), and the courts have found it reasonable to cut off the remedy of such a title holder who fails to timely assert his or her ownership rights ( see Humbert v. Trinity Church, supra at 603; see also 2 Rasch, New York Law and Practice of Real Property § 30.17, at 189 [2d ed 1991]; 1 Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, Adverse Possession § 5.09 [5th ed 2004]). As the essence of adverse possession is the loss of title due to the title holder's inaction in the face of an open and hostile possession ( see Baker v. Oakwood, 123 NY 16, 28-29), the possessor's knowledge of the invalidity of his or her claim of title is immaterial ( see Monnot v. Murphy, 207 NY 240, 245).

However, the possessor's overt acknowledgment that another holds title, prior to the running of the statutory period, will defeat a claim of adverse possession because then it "is not a claim in utter hostility to the true title" ( Bedell v. Shaw, 59 NY 46, 49; see Guariglia v. Blima Homes, 89 NY2d 851, 853 [agreement permitting possessor's use of disputed parcel constituted an acknowledgment]; Van Gorder v. Masterplanned, Inc., 78 NY2d 1106, 1107-1108 [oral concession of another's ownership during the statutory period would constitute an acknowledgment and negate a claim of right]; Falco v. Pollitts, 298 AD2d 838, 839 [possessor's initial attempt to purchase the land constituted an acknowledgment that title was in another and the possessor had no claim of right]; Dittmer v. Jacwin Farms, 224 AD2d 477, 478 [description in deed to possessor explicitly excluding the disputed parcel — not merely failing to include it — constituted possessor's acknowledgment during the statutory period]; 2 NY Jur 2d, Adverse Possession § 61). Here, defendants do not allege that plaintiffs ever overtly recognized or acknowledged defendants' title. Rather, plaintiffs have consistently asserted their claim of ownership of the parcel throughout the statutory period.

In the absence of an overt acknowledgment, our courts have recognized since Humbert v. Trinity Church ( supra) that an adverse possessor's claim of right or ownership will not be defeated by mere knowledge that another holds legal title. This principle requires that knowledge be distinguished from a possessor's overt acknowledgment of title in another ( see Bernat v. Echo Socy. of Niagara Falls, N.Y., 7 NY2d 914, revg 8 AD2d 760, 762-763 [statements which do not amount to a disclaimer or disavowal of the claim to the property, but merely indicate that the possessors were aware that they had no record title, do not defeat a claim of right]; Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 NY 362, 370-371 ["(T)he bona fides of the claim of the occupant is not essential" and it is immaterial "that the (occupant) knew all along that he was in the wrong"]; Monnot v Murphy, supra at 244 [a prior judgment confirming the owner's title and ousting the possessor did not preclude subsequent adverse claim by the same possessor; despite possessor's obvious knowledge that he did not own the land, his subsequent possession "without any . . . recognition of title in another, or disavowal of title in himself," effectively gave notice to the rightful owner that an adverse occupation existed]; Barnes v. Light, 116 NY 34, 39-40 ["actually occup(ying) and improv(ing) the land . . ., if done in good faith (that is, without recognition of title in another or disavowal of title in oneself), . . . `will establish the fact of a claim of title'"]; Nazarian v. Pascale, 225 AD2d 381, 383 ["(O)ur courts have historically applied an objective test of focusing simply on the adverse possessor's use of the property as his own"]; see also Joseph v. Whitcombe, 279 AD2d 122, 127 [observing that New York does not consider the possessor's subjective intent, but finding no entry under claim of right where the possessor entered as a squatter who had acknowledged another's title by passing the property's tax bills on to the title owner]; Parella, Real Property, 51 Syracuse L Rev 703, 717-721 [2001]).

We recognize that the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz ( 304 NY 95) suggests that the possessors' testimony at trial, after the statutory period had run, namely, that they knew when they entered onto the disputed parcel that it was not their own land, would prevent their possession from being "under a claim of title" ( id. at 99). We consider this view to be dictum, however, and not controlling because the Court expressly found no adverse possession due to the lack of cultivation, enclosure or improvement of the disputed parcel ( id. at 98-99). In addition, Judge Fuld and two other judges dissented, stating: "That [the possessor] knew that he did not have the record title to the property . . . is of no consequence, so long as he intended, notwithstanding that fact, to acquire and use the property as his own" ( id. at 102).

There is a separate line of cases which also recognizes that the possessor's knowledge and intent are of no consequence by upholding adverse possession claims where the possessor mistakenly believes that he or she owns the property being possessed ( see Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 NY 296; Fatone v. Vona, 287 AD2d 854; Bradt v. Giovannone, 35 AD2d 322; West v. Tilley, 33 AD2d 228, lv denied 27 NY2d 481; see also French v. Pearce, 8 Conn 439, 443 ). The issue of whether the possessor's belief that he or she is not claiming another's property will disprove the existence of a hostile claim of right was addressed in New York as early as 1860 ( see Crary v. Goodman, 22 NY 170, 175), and it continues to arise when trial courts erroneously conclude that the unintentional or inadvertent possession of another's property cannot be deemed to be adverse ( see e.g. Gore v. Cambareri, 303 AD2d 551, 553; Fatone v. Vona, supra at 857). These cases hold that mistaken possession, despite the possessor's lack of intent to enter upon the land of another, may ripen into ownership because it is the visible, outward acts of ownership and use, rather than the possessor's subjective motive or belief, that effectively give notice of the intention to possess as owner and constitute the required hostile claim of right ( see Bradt v. Giovannone, supra at 325-326; West v. Tilley, supra at 231). Thus, under this line of cases as well, the possessor's subjective belief has no effect on the claim of adverse possession.

Drawing on this principle mirrored in these two lines of cases, we have expressly held that the possessor's knowledge or belief as to who owns the disputed parcel is immaterial to a claim of adverse possession ( see Birkholz v. Wells, 272 AD2d 665, 666-667; see also Harrington v. Estate of Crouse, 1 AD3d 778, 779; Moore v. City of Saratoga Springs, 296 AD2d 707, 709-710; Fatone v. Vona, supra at 856-857; Bradt v. Giovannone, supra at 325-326). In Birkholz v. Wells ( supra), this Court addressed a situation where, as is alleged here, the possessors had been aware that they did not own the disputed parcel. We expressly held that the possessors' subjective awareness or motives did not affect the adverse character of their actions ( id. at 666-667). Although County Court acknowledged our ruling in Birkholz, it misconstrued the "hostile and under claim of right" element of adverse possession ( see RPAPL 521), viewing it as imposing two distinctly different requirements and limiting our holding in Birkholz to hostility alone.

Contrary to County Court's perception, the two parts of this element have been viewed as virtually synonymous. Both parts require that the possession be truly adverse to the rights of the party holding record title ( see Brand v. Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636 ["Reduced to its essentials, (claim of right) means nothing more than that there must be possession in fact of a type that would give the owner a cause of action in ejectment against the occupier throughout the prescriptive period"]; Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, supra at 99 [a claim of right or title means "in other words, hostile"]; Harrington v. Estate of Crouse, supra at 779 [Under claim of right assures that the possession is "`with an intention to possess (as an owner)'" rather than a permissive use by a tenant or licensee which would acknowledge the title holder's ownership]; 1 Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, Adverse Possession § 5.17 [5th ed 2004]). Since "`[t]he actual possession and improvement of the premises, as owners are accustomed to possess and improve their estates, . . . will establish the fact of a claim of title'" ( Barnes v. Light, 116 NY 34, 39-40, supra [citation omitted]; see 2 NY Jur 2d, Adverse Possession § 40) and since it is undisputed that plaintiffs here possessed the parcel always claiming to be its owners, County Court erred in finding that plaintiffs failed to establish, as a matter of law, this element of adverse possession.

Finally, we note that County Court relied upon two cases in the Second Department which appear to have found an acknowledgment where the possessor merely knew of another's title or admitted another's title after the statutory period had run ( see Harbor Estates Ltd. Partnership v. May, 294 AD2d 399, 400; Bockowski v. Malak, 280 AD2d 572, 572). We decline to follow these cases and rely instead on what we view to be controlling precedent holding that a claim of right will be defeated only if the possessor's acknowledgment of another's title is clearly shown by words or conduct and occurs during the statutory period ( see Guariglia v. Blima Homes, 89 NY2d 851, 853, supra; Van Gorder v. Masterplanned, Inc., 78 NY2d 1106, 1107-1108, supra; Moore v. City of Saratoga Springs, supra at 710; Albright v. Beesimer, 288 AD2d 577, 579-580; Gerlach v. Russo Realty Corp., 264 AD2d 756, 757; Reynolds v. Arnold, 221 AD2d 733, 734-735, appeal dismissed 87 NY2d 953; Garrett v. Holcomb, 215 AD2d 884, 885; cf. Birkholz v. Wells, supra at 667).

Since we conclude that an adverse possession claim can succeed regardless of the possessor's subjective knowledge or belief, defendants' proffer of evidence showing that plaintiffs had been aware that they did not own the parcel was insufficient to raise a material issue of fact. Accordingly, upon renewal, County Court erred in reversing its prior determination of plaintiffs' cross motion.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as partially denied plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment; cross motion partially granted as to the improved portion of the parcel; and, as so modified, affirmed.

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WALLING v. PRZYBYLO
(Sep 29, 2005)