It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of driving in the wrong direction on a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1127 [a]) and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of, inter alia, murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25). We reject the contention of defendant with respect to both appeals that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel pursued "a single erroneous legal theory" on a motion to suppress evidence. To the extent that the contention of defendant survives his pleas of guilty ( see People v. Burke, 256 AD2d 1244, lv denied 93 NY2d 851), we conclude that his contention lacks merit ( see generally People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404). Defendant has failed to establish that different suppression motion theories, if advanced, would have been successful ( see People v. Peterson, 19 AD3d 1015; People v. Phelps, 4 AD3d 863, 864, lv denied 2 NY3d 804; People v. Coleman, 305 AD2d 1031, lv denied 100 NY2d 579). "In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel" ( Ford, 86 NY2d at 404; see generally People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147; Phelps, 4 AD3d at 864). Finally, defendant's bargained-for sentence in appeal No. 2 is not unduly harsh or severe.