DAVIS, Judge.
Michael Morris (Husband) appeals the trial court's distribution of the marital estate and award of attorney fees to Karen Morris (Wife). We affirm.
Husband argues that the trial court's distribution of the marital estate was an abuse of discretion. "There is no fixed formula for determining a division of property in a divorce action." Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). "The trial court has wide discretion in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Id. "Absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with a property award." Id.
Husband first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it valued as marital property certain gifts that the parties had given each other during the marriage. We disagree. Trial courts have wide discretion in property division regardless of the property's source. See id. Generally, a gift of interest in separately owned property is considered marital property when it is given by one spouse to another. See id.;Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 22, 993 P.2d 887 ("Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her interest in separately acquired property into the marital estate."). Even if we analyzed the gifts given during the marriage as if they had come from a third party, trial courts consider gifts to be marital property if the non-acquiring spouse contributed to the property, the property lost its identity through commingling or exchanges, or the acquiring spouse gifted an interest in the property to the other spouse. See Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d at 535. Here, Wife contributed to the property she gave Husband — she was the one who actually purchased the gifts during their marriage, using marital funds to do so. And the trial court, having heard the evidence, is in the best position to know whether the gifts at issue lost their identity through commingling or exchanges. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it valued as marital property the gifts that the parties had given each other.
The gifts challenged here include items such as skis, golf clubs, binoculars, and a grill. The trial court did not include in the marital property the value of the parties' anniversary or wedding rings.
Husband also argues that the trial court erred because it did not place a value on every item on the parties' lists, but instead ruled that:
The parties have acquired other personal property during the course of the marriage which shall be divided as they presently hold it. The exhibits and the testimony offered do not convince the [c]ourt, to the required burden of proof, that there need be any further finding of values needed to equalize the division of the marital estate since the exhibits tend to support the "award as hold" division.
"[T]he general purpose to be achieved by a property division . . . is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quotations and citation omitted). Here, the parties divided up certain property prior to the divorce proceedings, and the trial court, having heard the evidence, was in the best position to determine whether the property was divided in a manner that "best serve[d] the needs of the parties and best permit[ted] them to pursue their separate lives." Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Finally, Husband challenges the trial court's valuation of certain property. "Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court, and this [c]ourt will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quotations and citation omitted). Here, the parties gave differing opinions regarding the value of the truck, and the trial court simply chose Wife's valuation over Husband's. "It is elementary that a judge is not bound to believe one witness's testimony to the total exclusion of that of another witness. When acting as the trier of fact, the trial judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever weight he or she deems appropriate." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). Husband's argument here is "nothing but an attempt to have this [c]ourt substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on a contested factual issue." Id. We decline to do so. The trial court here, in choosing Wife's valuation of the truck over Husband's, did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's valuation.
Husband also argues, in passing, that the trial court erred when it distributed the marital debt because it "did not value the debts, [but] simply allocated the debts without a value and without taking that value into consideration in the overall property division." However, Husband's analysis ends there. We will not address this issue because we are not "simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 37, 38 P.3d 291 (quotations and citation omitted); see also MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948 n. 9 (Utah 1998) (giving examples of a "legion" of inadequately briefed cases).
Husband also argues that the trial court erroneously awarded attorney fees to Wife. We disagree. "An award of attorney fees . . . in divorce actions rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). However, the award of such fees "must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and reasonableness of the requested fees." Id. at 444 (quotations and citation omitted).
Husband appears to challenge Wife's financial need, arguing that Wife should not have been awarded attorney fees because she "was awarded ample personal property to satisfy her attorney fees." However, when awarding attorney fees, Utah courts ordinarily consider the distribution of property when the property generates income or includes liquid assets. See, e.g.,Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 726 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (affirming trial court's denial of attorney fees where wife would be receiving $108,000 in a final lump sum property settlement);Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (holding that parties should each pay their own attorney fees where "[w]ife had received funds through the sale of the motor home, cash left to her when [h]usband left the state, money received from the sale of the house, and the other assets"). Here, the majority of the property distributed to Wife does not and cannot generate income. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by not considering Wife's share of the marital property when awarding attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney fees.
We affirm the trial court's distribution of marital property and award of attorney fees. Because Wife was awarded attorney fees by the trial court and she is the prevailing party on appeal, she is entitled to attorney fees incurred in this appeal.See Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). We therefore affirm and remand for entry of an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
I CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding Judge.