Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs to the petitioner payable by Suffolk County Fleet Services, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a framed issue hearing in accordance herewith, and for a new determination of the petition thereafter.
As correctly conceded by the proposed additional respondent, Suffolk County Fleet Services (hereinafter Suffolk), a self-insured municipality is required to provide mandatory uninsured motorist benefits to employees who operate municipal motor vehicles ( see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Amato, 72 NY2d 288, 293-294; Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. [Manning], 96 AD2d 471, affd 62 NY2d 748; see also Insurance Law § 3420 [f] [1]). Contrary to Suffolk's contention, however, a statutory arbitration proceeding to resolve a coverage dispute concerning an uninsured motorist claim is not a claim founded upon a tort, requiring the service of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (1) (a) ( see County Law § 52; General Municipal Law § 50-i; cf. Matter of City of Syracuse v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 61 NY2d 691; Matter of Manhattan Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth. v. Evans, 95 AD2d 470). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e. Although the appellant's contention that a notice of claim was not a condition precedent is raised for the first time on appeal, we nevertheless reach it as a matter of discretion since it involves a question of law that appears on the face of the record and, if brought to the attention of the Supreme Court, could not have been avoided ( see Weiner v. MKVII-Westchester, LLC, 292 AD2d 597, 598).
Because the court never reached the issue we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a framed issue hearing to determine whether Suffolk received notice given by or on behalf of the injured person as soon as was reasonably practicable ( cf. 11 NYCRR 65.11 [m] [2]; Insurance Law § 3420 [a] [3] and [4]; Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v Mancuso, 93 NY2d 487; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. [Fuccio], 288 AD2d 46).
The appellant's remaining argument is academic in light of our determination.