VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge
After a hearing on August 11, 2005 ("August 11 Hearing"), and by Decision and Order dated August 12, 2005 (the "Summary Order"), the Court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction brought by plaintiffs Cartier, division of Richemont North America, Inc. and Cartier International B.V. (collectively, "Cartier"). Cartier sought to enjoin defendants Aaron Faber, Inc., d/b/a Aaron Faber Gallery, and Edward Faber (collectively, "Faber"), JP Timepieces ("JP") and other unnamed defendants (collectively, "Defendants") from offering for sale, advertising or distributing altered or modified Cartier watches, and, in particular, stainless steel Cartier watches which have been altered through the addition of diamonds to the bezel or case. The Court issued a subsequent Decision and Order, dated September 30, 2005 (the "Decision"), to further explain the injunction issued in the Summary Order. See Cartier II, 2005 WL 2429649, at *1 ("This opinion shall serve as the further explication of the injunction granted at the August 11, 2005 hearing."); Cartier I, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 624 ("The Court will address the concerns raised by the parties in a separate opinion that will more thoroughly explain the basis for and scope of the preliminary injunction ordered by the Court at the August 11 Hearing and as memorialized below.").
The August 12 Summary Order is reported as Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc. ("Cartier I"), 382 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The Decision is reported as Cartier v. Aaron Faber, Inc. ("Cartier II"), — F. Supp. 2d — 2005 WL 2429649 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005).
Cartier and Faber both now move for an Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and Local Civil Rule 6.3 ("Local Rule 6.3") granting clarification, modification or reconsideration of the preliminary injunction entered by the Court. For the reasons set forth below, their motions are denied.
Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." In re Health Management Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Under Local Rule 6.3, which governs motions for reconsideration, the moving party must demonstrate controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying motion that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the court's decision. See Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group Inc., 28 Fed. Appx. 73, 74, 2002 WL 109483, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2002); SEC v. Ashbury Capital Partners, L.P., No. 00 Civ. 7898, 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001) (citing ATT Corp. v. Comty. Network Servs., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 316, 2000 WL 1174992, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2000) and Local Rule 6.3). Local Rule 6.3 is intended to "ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party [from] examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters." See id. (citing Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). A Court must narrowly construe and strictly apply Local Rule 6.3, so as to avoid duplicative rulings on previously considered issues, and to prevent the rule from being used as a substitute for appealing a final judgment. See Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (noting that a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for the moving party "to argue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved.").
Both parties identify what they regard as an inconsistency between the Court's Summary Order and the subsequent Decision. The inconsistency referred to concerns whether the Defendants are enjoined from the sale of used Cartier watches that have been altered by their previous owners. Although the precise issue is not explicitly addressed in the Summary Order, the terms of the injunction could plausibly be construed to bar such sales, while the Decision would allow for them. See Cartier II, 2005 WL 2429649, at *5 ("The scope of this injunction does not include the sale of used watches by Faber or JP that were altered by their previous owners."). Thus, the Court is persuaded that, read together, there is some ambiguity between the two provisions.
To the extent that the Decision may be interpreted as conflicting in any way with the earlier Order granting the preliminary injunction, the Summary Order defines the scope of the injunction entered by the Court at the August 11 Hearing. By its own terms, the Decision was meant to further explicate the Court's basis for the injunction entered at the Hearing, as stated in the Summary Order, and was not intended to alter the substance of the injunction granted by the Summary Order. Any unresolved issues as to the scope of any permanent injunction, should such injunction be warranted after the adjudication of the merits of Cartier's case, will be determined by the Court after such adjudication has taken place. Until such time, the injunction as stated in the Summary Order remains in place.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants Aaron Faber, Inc., d/b/a Aaron Faber Gallery and Edward Faber (collectively, "Faber"), JP Timepieces ("JP") and other unnamed defendants (collectively, "Defendants") are enjoined from the infringement of the trademark "Cartier" owned by plaintiffs Cartier, division of Richemont North America, Inc. and Cartier International B.V. (collectively, "Cartier") as previously outlined in the Court's Order dated August 12, 2005 (the "Summary Order"); and it is further,
ORDERED that the motions under Local Rule 6.3 (Docket No. 35) submitted by Faber and Cartier for reconsideration of the Court's Summary Order and its Decision and Order dated September 30, 2005 are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.