Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual ( see CPLR 214; McCoy v. Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301). Here, the defendants sustained their burden of making a prima facie showing that the complaint was time-barred by submitting evidence that the plaintiff's malpractice claim accrued no later than January 2001, when his time to file a notice of appeal from the adverse order in the underlying mortgage foreclosure action expired, and that this action was not commenced until more than three years later ( id.; see Gravel v. Cicola, 297 AD2d 620). The evidence which the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the running of the statute of limitations beyond January 2001 ( see McCoy v. Feinman, supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to renew, since he failed to offer a reasonable justification for his failure to submit the additional evidence upon which he relied with the original motion ( see R.R. Ragette, Inc. v. D'Incecco, 17 AD3d 436; Gohrig v. Porcelli, 17 AD3d 314; Hannalyn Realty Co. v. McLaughlin, 10 AD3d 409).